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Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres 
 
Changing the Wind: Notes Toward a Demosprudence 
of Law and Social Movements  
abstract.  This essay was influenced by a class on Law and Social Movements that 
Professors Guinier and Torres taught at the Yale Law School in 2011. This essay was also 
informed by numerous conversations with Bruce Ackerman regarding his book that is under 
review in this Symposium. While we are in fundamental agreement with Professor Ackerman’s 
project, as well as the claims he makes as to the new constitutional canon, we supplement his 
analysis with the overlooked impact of the lawmaking potential of social movements. In 
particular, we focus on those social movements that were critical to the legal changes that formed 
the core of Professor Ackerman’s book. The strong claim that we are making is that the social 
movements of the civil rights era were actually sources of law. The weaker claim is that these 
social movements deeply influenced the formal legal changes represented by the statutes and 
Supreme Court decisions that framed the constitutional moment so convincingly illustrated by 
Professor Ackerman. In order to make the stronger claim, we demonstrate how social 
movements made some legal conclusions not just more likely, but for all intents and purposes, 
inevitable. The way the Court interpreted existing racial justice jurisprudence and was 
responsive to the constitutional understanding represented by non-elite actors in the civil rights 
and social justice movements that had their high water mark in the 1950s and ’60s. 
 
authors.  Gerald Torres recently joined the permanent faculty at the Cornell Law School, 
where he is currently the Marc and Beth Goldberg Distinguished Visiting Professor. Professor 
Torres previously held the Bryant Smith Chair at the University of Texas Law School. He was a 
Visiting Professor at Yale Law School from 2011 to 2012. Lani Guinier joined the faculty at 
Harvard Law School in 1998, where she is the Bennett Boskey Professor of Law. Guinier was a 
professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School from 1988 to 1998. Professors Torres 
and Guinier thank the students who enrolled in our seminars and courses in Law and Social 
Movements at Harvard, Yale, and University of Texas Law Schools and who helped us think 
through these issues with their probing questions and important insights. 
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introduction 
I say here’s how you recognize a member of Congress. They’re the ones 
walking around with their fingers up in the air. And then they lick their 
finger and they put it back up and they see which way the wind is blowing. 
 
You can’t change a nation by replacing one wet-fingered politician with 
another. You change a nation when you change the wind. You change the way 
the wind is blowing, it’s amazing how quickly they respond. And so you look 
at Selma, Alabama, and how that led to a Voting Rights Act five months 
later. Johnson had told King just before Selma, it’ll take five years to get a 
Voting Rights Act. King said, I can’t wait five years. He organized Selma. 
And we’ve got to now be wind-changers. Not lobbyists, but wind-changers. 
How do we—by our service, by our doing in our lives—how do we then join 
together and knit together a movement that holds politics accountable? 
 
–Reverend Jim Wallis1 
 
In his important new book, We the People: The Civil Rights Revolution, 
Bruce Ackerman argues that the statutes of constitutional dimension passed in 
the second half of the twentieth century, which function like modern 
constitutional amendments, are “privileged expressions of We the People.” 
Like Professor Ackerman, we believe that the civil rights revolution was “one of 
the most successful exercises in constitutional politics in American history.”2 
Yet, in most legal accounts, the role of lawyers and the courts take center stage. 
Even cause lawyers, whose goals are consistent with the highest calling of their 
profession and our democracy, still tend to think primarily if not exclusively in 
terms of their own professional tools for lawmaking. They focus on creating 
social or economic change by expanding and/or reinterpreting the legal canon, 
often attempting to defend and reinterpret many of its most famous cases. The 
aim of Professor Ackerman’s “exercise is to enable law-trained folk to use a 
small set of texts to generate deep and broad insights into our governing 
arrangements.”3 
 
1.  Krista Tippett, Transcript for Jim Wallis—The New Evangelical Leaders, Part I, ON  
BEING (Nov. 29, 2007), http://www.onbeing.org/program/new-evangelical-leaders-part-i 
-jim-wallis/transcript/1299. 
2.  3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 9 (2014). 
3.  Id. at 8. 
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Professor Ackerman urges us to look at the politics and the deep 
constitutive changes wrought by legislative, administrative, and judicial action, 
and to understand those statutes, executive orders, and elections as part of the 
true constitutional history of the modern era. An obsessive focus on judicial 
decisions causes the observer to lose sight of the other venues in which real 
legal change occurs. Yet those like Professor Ackerman who are instrumental in 
identifying and developing the legal canon often overlook the important 
contribution of social movement activism. The Second Reconstruction may 
have Brown v. Board of Education4 as its lodestar, but it was also the concerted 
actions of a mobilized people that gave heft and constitutional value to the legal 
changes following Brown. The legislative and administrative initiatives that 
would normally be conceived of as sub-constitutional changes were given 
constitutional weight by the concerted action of the Supreme Court and the 
mobilized constituencies that demanded those changes. 
Our essay largely agrees with this aspect of Professor Ackerman’s book: it is 
the people in combination with the legal elite who change the fundamental 
normative understandings of our Constitution. We argue that social 
movements are critical not only to the changes Professor Ackerman chronicles, 
but also to the cultural shifts that make durable legal change possible. We 
believe that the role played by social movement activism is as much a source of 
law as are statutes and judicial decisions. Our goal, therefore, is to create 
analytic space to enable a greater understanding of lawmaking as the work of 
mobilized citizens in conjunction with, not separate from, legal professionals. 
Our aim is to better understand and recognize the important roles played by 
ordinary people who succeed in challenging unfair laws through the sounds 
and determination of their marching feet. The role played by legal 
professionals—from judges to legislators to lawyers—is essential. Yet the civil 
rights movement grew in its efficacy in the 1950s and 1960s—helping to 
expand the “constitutional canon”—by putting its boots on the ground. It was 
the mobilization of ordinary people willing to play a significant role in shifting 
the law both locally and nationally that had a decisive effect.5 
 
4.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
5.  Levels of Power, POWERCUBE, http://www.powercube.net/analyse-power/levels-of-power 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2014). John Gaventa’s power cube analysis builds on the forms, spaces, 
and levels of power. The forms dimension refers to the ways in which power manifests 
itself, including its visible, hidden, and invisible forms. The spaces dimension of the power 
cube refers to the potential arenas for participation and action, including what Gaventa calls 
closed, invited, and claimed spaces. The levels dimension of the power cube refers to the 
differing layers of decision-making and authority held on a vertical scale, including the local, 
national, and global. 
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Thus, this essay argues that social movements6 have played key roles in 
redefining the meaning of our democracy by creating the necessary conditions 
for a genuine “community of consent.” We contrast two views. On one side is 
James Madison’s characterization of one view of the role of the people: “When 
they have established government [the people] should think of nothing but 
obedience, leaving the care of their liberties to their wiser rulers.”7 On the other 
side is Frederick Douglass: “We, the people—not we, the white people—not 
we, the citizens, or the legal voters—not we, the privileged class, and excluding 
all other classes but we, the people . . . the men and women, the human 
inhabitants of the United States, do ordain and establish this Constitution.”8 
The authority, the right, and the power to govern are never complete, but are 
in trust to the various institutions of democracy. 
Like Martin Luther King, Jr., we believe that it is often by the thick action 
of concerted social movement through which “we the people”—meaning, in 
our view, the people who reflect a genuine community of consent—discover 
and legitimize the principles on which our democracy presumably rests. We 
use the “wind changers” metaphor to test the following four-part hypothesis: 
 
6.  For a definition of social movements and their distinction from interest groups, see infra pp. 
2756-62. Our definition of social movements borrows from SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN 
MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 1-9 (2d ed. 1998). 
Contentious politics involves a repertoire of actions, discourses, and visionary goals that tell 
a story that (1) seizes historically contingent openings, (2) mobilizes popular will (not just in 
terms of polls, but also in terms of “the will to act”), (3) builds on networks of social 
solidarity, and (4) finds sites for narrative resistance in which to transpose/transport 
grievances into causes that resonate with the larger culture’s narratives of justice. 
Contentious politics engages opponents over time and changes the meaning of law, not just 
its rules. Id.; see CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. 
Scheingold eds., 2006); MICHAEL MCCANN, LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 508 (2004); 
CHARLES TILLY & SIDNEY TARROW, CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (2007). 
7.  James Madison, Who Are the Best Keepers of the People’s Liberties?, NAT’L GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 
1792, reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1790-1802, at 120 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 
1906), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/madison-the-writings-vol-6-1790-1802. 
8.  Frederick Douglass, Speech on the Dred Scott Decision (May 14, 1857), in TWO SPEECHES BY 
FREDERICK DOUGLASS 40 (Rochester, N.Y., C.P. Dewey 1857), http://www.libraryweb 
.org/~digitized/books/Two_Speeches_by_Frederick_Douglass.pdf; see also Frederick 
Douglass, Unconstitutionality of Slavery (Mar. 26, 1860), in SELECTED ADDRESSES OF 
FREDERICK DOUGLASS: AN AFRICAN AMERICAN HERITAGE BOOK 75, 96 (2008) (“[W]hat do 
we want? We want this: whereas slavery has ruled the land, now must liberty; whereas pro-
slavery men have sat in the Supreme Court of the United States, and given the constitution 
a pro-slavery interpretation against its plain reading, let us by our votes put men into that 
Supreme Court who will decide, and who will concede that that constitution is not 
slavery.”). 
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1.   For those interested in social change, it is useful to view lawmaking 
from the perspective of popular mobilizations, such as social 
movements and other sustained forms of contentious politics and 
collective action that serve to make formal institutions, including 
those that regulate legal culture, more democratic. 
2.   One of the important functions of law resides in its power to 
translate lived experience into a series of stories about individual 
and social fairness and justice. Although courts and lawyers are 
important participants in the creation of these narratives through 
the shaping of the discourse of law, social movements and 
organized constituencies of non-expert participants also play an 
important role in the creation of authoritative interpretative 
communities.9 
3.   A fundamental claim of legal liberalism is that social movements 
achieve their goals when they translate their claims into law. The 
most efficient way of achieving social change, therefore, is directly 
through litigation and legislative actions. A commitment to legal 
liberalism drives the litigation and policy focus that is the priority 
of conventional cause lawyering. We posit almost the reverse: for 
legal change to reflect real social change it must take account of, 
and engage with, alternative or contending sources of power. Such 
change must also, in some measure, transform the culture.10 
4.   We do not want to minimize the importance of legislative change, 
especially legislation of constitutional dimension.11 Our main point 
is that such legislative change—and to a large extent judicially 
driven change—gets its enduring force from “We, the People.”12 
 
9.  See STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE 
COMMUNITIES (1980); JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN 
CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990). 
10.  See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social Change, 
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967 (1997). Conservative critics of social justice movements fear this 
cultural transformation most of all. See, e.g., “A COUNTRY I DO NOT RECOGNIZE”: THE 
LEGAL ASSAULT ON AMERICAN VALUES (Robert H. Bork ed., 2005). 
11.  See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 2. 
12.  Id.; see also CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS NAMED AND 
UNNAMED (1997). Both of these noted constitutional scholars treat the Preamble not as 
surplusage, but as an integral and legally significant part of the Constitution–no throat 
clearing for the “Founders.” When we argue for legitimate and durable social change we 
want to be clear that our emphasis is on change that is democracy enhancing. By democracy 
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Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, those who were 
interested in progressive social change often turned to the courts because the 
institutions of normal politics excluded them, especially blacks and other 
stigmatized or politically weak minorities.13 They saw the Supreme Court as 
the only federal institution in our constitutional democracy that would protect 
the basic rights of numerical, stigmatized, or politically weak minorities. 
Progressive change agents relied on liberal principles of constitutional 
democracy to defend and expand the role of judicial review to protect 
individual rights against the biases or unfairness of majoritarian politics or 
other forms of process failure. 
Scholars like Michael Klarman, Larry Kramer, Gerald Rosenberg, and 
Mark Tushnet have raised questions about this emphasis on court-centered 
social change.14 Those who oppose the role of the courts have challenged the 
legitimacy of judicial review by raising what is commonly known as the 
“counter-majoritarian” difficulty.15 Or, they contend, as Gerald Rosenberg 
does, that the courts offer only a “hollow hope”—a battle won, but a war lost.16 
Rosenberg argues that legal victories often act as flypaper, attracting social 
 
enhancing we mean the creation of both constituencies of accountability and alternative and 
authoritative interpretative communities. These interlaced changes are democracy 
enhancing because they give agency to those otherwise excluded or marginalized by the 
conventional structure of electoral politics. Democracy-enhancing social change reminds us 
that genuine communities of consent are what justify democracy. 
13.  A counterexample is the labor movement, especially during the period of the New Deal, 
when labor unions were able to get the attention of all three branches of government. The 
normal political branches were even able to discipline a reluctant Supreme Court by 
threatening the Court’s supremacy, reflected in the “switch in time that saved nine.” The 
neo-Lochnerianism that is current today shows, however, that without deep cultural change, 
no political victory is ever secure. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: 
POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011); TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (2012). 
14.  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education 
brought race issues to the public’s attention but that at the same time it energized the 
conservative opposition); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2005) (arguing that the meaning of the 
Constitution and its legitimacy is premised on the understanding of the people and is not 
subject to judicial supremacy); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS 
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991) (arguing that durable social change is neither 
produced nor sustained through litigation); MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL 
STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) (examining the relation 
between the people and their lawyers). 
15.  See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986). 
16.  See ROSENBERG, supra note 14. 
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change proponents who begin to defer to the courts to lead the movement for 
social change. Courts, he argues, are institutionally constrained from playing 
that role.17 In a related move, Michael Klarman argues that key Supreme Court 
opinions have tended to spark backlash, mobilizing those who resent the 
Court’s intervention.18 The backlash then undermines the Court’s ability to 
enforce its rulings. Others fault the political or ideological capture of this 
branch of government by conservative judges who are unsympathetic to 
individual rights claims when the rights bearers are disadvantaged or politically 
weak minorities.19 In fact, Professor Ackerman’s book is a sustained critique of 
just that court-centric focus. 
Some go further, questioning the efficacy of liberal legalism as a 
philosophical agenda. The liberal approach to constitutional democracy focuses 
on individual rights, is preoccupied with a procedural rather than a substantive 
concept of justice, and tends to confuse principles for power. When fair rules 
are considered independently of fair outcomes, large social problems may be 
“lawyerized” rather than redressed.20 Fair procedures become a surrogate for 
the more difficult task of advocating, in both legally and popularly recognizable 
terms, a substantive commitment to justice. Moreover, the articulation of legal 
rights often proceeds without comparable attention to the development of 
remedies and without a clear sense that the rights (which dominate the scope 
of the proposed remedies) actually address the problem at hand.21 Even when 
legal rights grant those with a grievance a highly individualistic remedy, the 
definition of those rights can be manipulated over time by clever lawyers and 
conservative judges to legitimate the status quo.22 At the same time, rights talk 
 
17.  Id. 
18.  KLARMAN, supra note 14. 
19.  See ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE 
COALITION (2008). 
20.  In another context, and in a rather flip expression of this process, the legal and corporate 
anthropologist Jane Anne Morris suggests that environmental regulation merely regulates 
environmentalists. See JANE ANNE MORRIS, GAVELING DOWN THE RABBLE: HOW “FREE 
TRADE” IS STEALING OUR DEMOCRACY (2008). This is why opposition to the Keystone 
Pipeline is more important as a mobilizing tool than as a point of judicial or legislative 
intervention. See, e.g., BILL MCKIBBEN, OIL AND HONEY: THE EDUCATION OF AN UNLIKELY 
ACTIVIST (2013). 
21.  In this way, litigation, for example, may shift power to the lawyer as a technician and limit 
the lawyer’s capacity to understand clients’ demands, which are translated primarily into 
legal principles. 
22.  Ralph Bunche articulates a thick version of this argument in an article published in 1935: 
Extreme faith is placed in the ability of . . . instruments of democratic government 
to free the minority from social proscription and civic inequality. The inherent 
  
the yale law journal 123:2740   2014  
2748 
 
locates the injury in a specific context that makes it vulnerable to charges of 
special interest pleading, while using the status of those who currently have 
power as the baseline for change. Women want what men have; blacks want 
what whites have. But neither group questions whether the preferences or 
arrangements enjoyed by men or whites fully embody the potential of a true 
democracy. Is the goal simply to reduce group inequality within a system that 
remains fundamentally unequal, unfair, or illegitimately hierarchical? 
Despite the growing chorus of scholars who argue that change neither 
begins nor ends with the courts, most constitutional scholars have nevertheless 
replicated a court-centric approach in their analysis. Proponents of legal 
liberalism, for example, claim in its defense that rights have important 
symbolic effects. Rights signal to those who have been left out that they, too, 
belong.23 Rights talk does more, however, than give individuals a sense of 
dignity. Rights can mobilize and inspire group action, as in the Montgomery 
Bus Boycott or in the actions of student sit-in demonstrators in the early 
1960s.24 Rights can also provide an agenda for group mobilization, translating 
local complaints to a more generalized cause. Proponents of legal liberalism 
also point to iconic cases like Brown v. Board of Education as having a long-term 
effect not just in rule shifting, but also in culture shifting.25 The liberal strategy, 
epitomized by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, was to change 
the governing rules institution by institution with the hope that linking those 
changes together would transform the culture.26 The problem was that the 
required focus on doctrine and rules deflected time, energy, and resources from 
the harder work of changing the culture. Like Professor Ackerman, we note 
that the sector-by-sector approach epitomized by Brown (even if predicated on 
 
fallacy of this belief rests in the failure to appreciate the fact that the instruments 
of the state are merely the reflections of the political and economic ideology of the 
dominant group, that the political arm of the state cannot be divorced from its 
prevailing economic structure, whose servant it must inevitably be. 
Ralph J. Bunche, A Critical Analysis of the Tactics and Program of Minority Groups, 4 J. NEGRO 
EDUC. 308, 315 (1935). 
23.  Cf. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991) (arguing that rights 
are a powerful symbolic message of belonging to marginalized or excluded groups). 
24.  See, e.g., CHARLES M. PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING TRADITION 
AND THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE 236, 236-64 (1995); Francesca Polletta, The 
Structural Context of Novel Rights Claims: Southern Civil Rights Organizing, 1961-1966, 34 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 367 (2000); infra pp. 2778-80.  
25.  See Stoddard, supra note 10. 
26.  See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School 
Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). 
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a commitment to generalizable principles) was an important but insufficient 
part of the crucial agenda-setting mechanism for activism. 
We seek in this essay to go beyond the debate over legal liberalism as a 
philosophy or as a justification for the role of judicial review in protecting 
minority rights. Instead we propose a new paradigm that we call 
demosprudence. Demosprudence is the study of the dynamic equilibrium of 
power between lawmaking and social movements. Demosprudence focuses on 
the legitimating effects of democratic action to produce social, legal, and 
cultural change. Although democratic accountability as a normative matter 
includes citizen mobilizations organized to influence a single election, a discrete 
piece of legislation, or a judicial victory, we focus on the interaction between 
lawmaking and popular, purposive mobilizations that seek significant, 
sustainable social, economic, and/or political change. Put differently, we seek 
to understand, analyze, and document those social movements that increase 
the extant democratic potential in our polity, and which do so in a way that 
produces durable social and legal change. 
Whereas jurisprudence examines the extent to which the rights of “discrete 
and insular” minorities are protected by judges interpreting ordinary legal and 
constitutional doctrine,27 demosprudence explores the ways that political, 
economic, or social minorities cannot simply rely on judicial decisions as the 
solution to their problems. Rather than turning over their agency to lawyers, 
they must find a way to integrate lawyers not as leaders but as fellow 
advocates. Borrowing a phrase from social theory, proponents of progressive 
social change must be advocates in themselves and for themselves and others. 
Understanding the roles played by social movements in producing durable 
social and legal change is central to our inquiry. 
A. Introducing Demosprudence 
As a method, demosprudence requires us to ask two overarching questions: 
(1) How and when do disadvantaged or weak minorities (whether political, 
economic, or identitarian) mobilize to protect their own rights in a majoritarian 
democracy?; and (2) Does the mobilization of these constituencies have a 
democracy-enhancing effect? By democracy enhancing, we mean that the 
mobilization opens up space to those previously excluded or marginalized and 
enables them to participate more fully in helping to make decisions that affect 
 
27.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail 
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, 
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
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their lives.28 Demosprudence, therefore, is the study of the relationship 
between social movements and law in the creation of authoritative meaning 
within a democratic polity.29 
Unlike jurisprudence, which analyzes the work of judges acting in formal 
sites such as courts, or legisprudence,30 which produces a secondary literature 
about how the work of elected representatives is an important source of 
lawmaking,31 demosprudence focuses on the ways that ongoing collective 
action by ordinary people can permanently alter the practice of democracy by 
changing the people who make the law and the landscape in which that law is 
made.32 Scholars of jurisprudence focus on the collection of rules imposed by 
authority and interpreted by jurists; scholars of legisprudence see the legislator 
or elected official as the pivotal actor. 
Scholars of demosprudence, by contrast, draw attention to the “dynamic 
constituencies” who call power to account through their participation in 
“contentious” politics and other forms of legal meaning making that also call 
 
28.  We ask: does the interaction between social movements and lawmaking allow discrete and 
insular minorities (or groups that have otherwise been relatively voiceless) an opportunity 
to participate directly—rather than through surrogates—in making and interpreting the 
decisions that affect their lives? In particular, we contrast the demosprudential effect of 
constituency mobilization to the counter-majoritarian difficulties that some associate with 
judicial review to protect the rights of discrete and insular minorities. 
29.  By democracy we mean something similar to what Robert Maynard Hutchins, former 
president of the University of Chicago, said in a 1962 interview: “Every member of the 
community must have a part in his government. The real test of democracy is the extent to 
which everybody in the society is involved in effective political discussion.” ROBERT M. 
HUTCHINS & JOSEPH P. LYFORD, THE POLITICAL ANIMAL: A CONVERSATION 2 (1962). 
30.  Jurisprudence predominantly deals with the question of the application and interpretation 
of the law by the judge. Legisprudence uses the tools and insights of legal theory to study 
legislation and regulation, i.e., the creation of law by the legislator. Julius Cohen introduced 
this term to describe the theoretical study of the legislative (as opposed to the judicial) 
aspect of legal philosophy. Julius Cohen, Legisprudence: Problems and Agenda, 11 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1163 (1983); Julius Cohen, Towards Realism in Legisprudence, 59 YALE L.J. 886 (1950); 
see also LUC J. WINTGENS ET AL., LEGISPRUDENCE: A NEW THEORETICAL APPROACH TO 
LEGISLATION (Luc J. Wintgens ed., 2002); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, 
Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 691, 693 
(1987). 
31.  See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 30. 
32.  The word “changing” in this sentence is ambiguous, but intentionally so. We mean that you 
can switch the people who are in power and, as a result, empower those who are members of 
the mobilized opposition, or you can transform the understanding of the roles and the 
obligations of the people in power without actually changing the individuals who occupy 
the roles. 
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democracy to account.33 Constituencies refer to those actors who make up the 
body of support for leaders and elites in the process of governing or policy 
change. We use the term “constituencies of accountability” to refer to those 
groups who are not committed primarily to any particular person or leader, but 
rather to a particular vision of change against which they measure the 
effectiveness of those using state power. 
We should be clear that demosprudence is not a philosophy of the left or 
the right. Neither is it the philosophy of unmediated preference gathering (like 
the populist initiative process or the market). Rather, demosprudence 
represents a philosophical commitment to the lawmaking force of meaningful 
participatory democracy. It is true that we deploy the interpretive device of 
demosprudence to examine social movements that represent those who were 
not part of the “consent community” and who challenge the legitimacy of those 
rules that flowed from the period of their exclusion or those rules that continue 
to exclude them. We are also interested in social movements where the 
principle at stake is democracy enhancing. But we want to reflect on the 
democracy-enhancing and meaning-making capacity of the conservative social 
movements of the 1980s and 1990s, not just the democratic meaning-making 
role of the civil rights or women’s rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s. 
For example, even though it is commonly defined by its conservative agenda, 
elements of the property rights movement are aimed at improving the 
confidence we have that the government works for the common good and not 
in the service of corporate special interests. We hope to encourage greater 
attention to the lawmaking (not just election-defining) effects of movements 
ranging from the abolitionists and suffragettes to the evangelical Christian, 
property rights, and gun rights movements of today. To that extent, they are 
worth exploring through the lens of demosprudence because they arguably 
expand the quotient of democratic legitimacy. 
As a methodology, we use the term demosprudence to invite empirical, 
comparative, and historical analysis of social movements whose aim has been 
political change defined more broadly than simply the effort to elect a 
 
33.  The term “dynamic constituencies” comes from Michael Grinthal, Power with: Practice 
Models for Social Justice Lawyering, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 25, 45 (2011). The term 
“contentious politics” comes from Sidney Tarrow. See TILLY & TARROW, supra note 6. One 
of us has further developed the concept of “demosprudence.” Lani Guinier, Courting the 
People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 89 B.U. L. REV. 539 (2009); see Lani 
Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Foreword: Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 40-41 (2008). 
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candidate of choice or to influence the outcome of a single election.34 
Demosprudence, in other words, is not primarily the study of electoral 
campaigns. Rather, it invokes a particular kind of challenge, which Sidney 
Tarrow calls “contentious politics.”35 
The methodology of demosprudence is organized around the evolving 
secondary literature in law and legal studies analyzing the role of citizen 
mobilizations in authoring new laws, changing the meaning of existing laws, 
and producing a more democratic understanding of how power functions in 
representational relationships. Such an effort emphasizes the tools that social 
movements use to make law and the role of ordinary people whose collective 
struggle and collective commitments inform the lawmaking process. We argue 
that the power of social groups is found in normal politics, but its more 
important role is in constitutive politics. Demosprudence is in the nature of an 
acid bath to remove the corrosion that has isolated the realm of the state from 
the legitimizing power of the people, except as it is expressed through 
conventional partisan politics and the act of representation by elites. 
As a practice, demosprudence trains its sights on the lawyer or public 
citizen who functions as a crucial source of moral authority and democratic 
legitimacy in facilitating the interaction between social movements and formal 
lawmaking. Demosprudence is a way to examine how lawyers and other public 
citizens represent social movements to make law. Rather than focus on the 
multiple ways in which lawyers guide movement activists through the thickets 
of law, we want to focus on the ways in which movement activists and a 
mobilized community can change thinking about the content of law and thus 
the horizon of the possible and sustainable. Borrowing from Thomas 
Stoddard’s terminology, we emphasize the role of culture shifting, not just rule 
shifting, in producing durable social change.36 
Through this process we aim to engage academics, activists, policymakers, 
and ordinary people in a larger conversation about the interaction between 
legal culture and popular mobilization, to supplement the court-centered view 
of law, and to specify the relationship between lawmaking and social 
movements. This is a conversation about how lawyer-citizens working with 
social movement activists authorize new meanings for lawmaking and thus 
challenge existing centers of power in service of democracy. 
 
34.  See, e.g., TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, THE COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG 
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011) (documenting the complex goals of social 
movements in the early civil rights period). 
35.  See supra notes 6 and 33 for Sidney Tarrow’s definition of contentious politics as distinct 
from ordinary, electoral politics. 
36.  See Stoddard, supra note 10. 
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For example, demosprudents might study public citizens/public lawyers 
who are multi-vocal change agents, who structure their interventions to (1) 
activate/animate dynamic community involvement, (2) make meaning, and (3) 
expand the source of authority to include mobilized constituencies of 
accountability. The ideal moral actor becomes the public citizen who calls 
power to account by also calling democracy to account.37 
Demosprudence as a lawyering practice involves a transformation of the 
lawyer/client relationship to build sites of democratic accountability internally 
and externally. Such a transformative process depends upon a participatory, 
power-sharing process within the lawyer/client relationship. Our conception of 
the social change role contemplates a strategic power-sharing partnership that 
builds on David Wilkins’s social obligation thesis,38 William Simon’s view of 
critical lawyering,39 Lucie White’s lawyering within the three dimensions of 
power,40 Thomas Stoddard’s culture-shifting versus rule-shifting analysis of 
 
37.  On one level, the professional commitments and responsibilities of all lawyers should be 
organized around their role as public citizens. For example, Preamble [6] of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct states that 
[a]s a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, access to the 
legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by 
the legal profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should 
cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that knowledge 
in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education. In addition, a lawyer 
should further the public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and 
the justice system because legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend 
on popular participation and support to maintain their authority. . . . [A]ll 
lawyers should devote professional time and resources and use civic influence to 
ensure equal access to our system of justice for all those who because of economic 
or social barriers cannot afford or secure adequate legal counsel. A lawyer should 
aid the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar 
regulate itself in the public interest. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. [6] (2013); see also id. pmbl. [7] (“A lawyer 
should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession 
and to exemplify the legal profession’s ideals of public service.”); id. pmbl. [8] (“A lawyer’s 
responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a public 
citizen are usually harmonious.”); id. pmbl. [13] (“Lawyers play a vital role in the 
preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of 
their relationship to our legal system.”). 
38.  David Wilkins, Fragmenting Professionalism: Racial Identity and the Ideology of Bleached Out 
Lawyering, 5 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 141 (1998) (highlighting the tension between the legal 
norm of “bleached out professionalism” and a lawyer’s social obligations). 
39.  William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984). 
40.  See, e.g., Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and 
Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699. 
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social change,41 Mike Grinthal’s taxonomy of the models of law and 
organizing,42 Scott Cummings and Ingrid Eagly’s critical reflection on law and 
organizing,43 and Marshall Ganz’s concept of strategic mobilization of 
resources.44 Neither the lawyer nor the client alone sets the terms or the goals 
of the relationship. Together they act out democracy.45 
The demos in demosprudence are those people who are collectively 
mobilized both to make change and to create constituencies of accountability to 
which their representatives (including non-elected elite decision makers) must 
answer. The “demos” in demosprudence is not “the community” at the micro 
level; nor is it the “representative of the community,” when those men and 
women are millionaires who represent their own ideals rather than those of 
their claimed “constituents.”46 Instead, it is a constituency of accountability 
that may or may not have geographic proximity as one of its binding forces.47 
 
41.  See Stoddard, supra note 10; see also Doug NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. 
REV. 941 (2011) (arguing that regardless of its outcome, litigation can provide an 
opportunity for mobilization). But see Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a 
Social Movement Strategy, 96 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 61 (2011) (arguing that litigation 
sometimes produces demobilization). 
42.  Grinthal, supra note 33. 
43.  Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA 
L. REV. 443 (2001); see also Doug NeJaime & Scott Cummings, Lawyering for Marriage 
Equality, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1235 (2010) (analyzing various approaches to litigation on behalf 
of marriage equality). 
44.  See also Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1053 (1970) 
(“Poverty will not be stopped by people who are not poor. If poverty is stopped, it will be 
stopped by poor people. And poor people can stop poverty only if they work at it together. 
The lawyer who wants to serve poor people must put his skills to the task of helping poor 
people organize themselves.”). 
45.  One of the ways people act out democracy is through the process of reflecting upon and 
learning from shared experiences. That self-reflective practice is stimulated by and often 
culminates in the making of new stories. These stories systematize the knowledge created by 
collective engagement, collective risk-taking, and collective action. These stories transform 
people’s willingness to act when they nurture relationships, highlight the contingencies of 
past choices, and illuminate future possibilities. 
46.  See Eric Lipton, Half of Congress Members are Millionaires, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.  
9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/10/us/politics/more-than-half-the-members-of 
-congress-are-millionaires-analysis-finds.html. 
47.  We differentiate constituency from community. See Marshall Ganz, Organizing  
Notes: What Is Organizing?, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV’T (2013), http://www 
.hcs.harvard.edu/summercamp/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/What-Is-Organizing-2013.pdf   
(arguing that the term “constituency” refers to a population that is “able to ‘stand together’ 
on behalf of common concerns”); John McKnight, Services Are Bad for People: You’re Either a 
Citizen or a Client, ORGANIZING, Spring/Summer 1991, at 41. In addition, Brittny-Jade 
Saunders notes that 
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Nor is it the “polity” writ large, or as an abstract construction. It is not the 
theory or practice of a riot or a lynch mob. Nor is it simply the study of 
elections, whether focused on representatives or referenda or initiatives. 
Instead, it is the study of how these communities (and constructed and 
mobilized constituencies) come together to produce durable social change. 
They succeed when they (1) shift the rules that govern social institutions, (2) 
transform the culture that controls the meaning of legal changes, and (3) affect 
the interpretation of those legal changes by providing the foundation for 
naturalizing those changes into the doctrinal structure of law and legal analysis. 
This process can be observed and analyzed sector by sector and institution by 
institution.48 
Demosprudence is not an adversary of jurisprudence. Rather it is an 
analysis of how social power circulates and finds its expression in law. 
Demosprudents examine the collective expressions of resistance (whether 
through counter-narratives or paradigm-shifting mobilizations) that test the 
democratic content of the formal institutions of lawmaking studied by 
jurisprudents and legisprudents. Demosprudence looks for the answers in the 
people themselves when organized as dynamic constituencies and not as 
isolated individual preference holders. We are most concerned with law and 
the meaning-making potential of mobilized constituencies. At the same time, 
we want to keep the focus on the role of social movements in enhancing 
 
[o]ften, as in the legislative context, constituents and their interests are 
represented by a particular advocate, policymaker, movement leader, or 
organization. Ideally, however, constituents are not passive recipients of these 
actors’ largesse, but rather are active participants in the processes that shape their 
fortunes. Organized constituencies are capable of holding leaders accountable for 
their actions or omissions. They are also crucial to the vitality of social and 
political movements. They play a vital role both by moving—contributing ideas 
and inspiration that influence leaders—and by being moved—to change their ways 
of thinking and to take action. Scholars and practitioners of social change have 
distinguished between “clients” or “customers,” who are made dependent on 
service providers, and constituents who are empowered through their 
relationships with other actors to exercise “voice” and exert greater influence on 
their social and political worlds. 
Big Ideas and “Boots on the Ground”: Proposing a Constituency-Building Approach to the 
Achievement of Progressive Social Change 5 (Mar. 12, 2008) (unpublished student paper, 
Harvard Law School) (on file with authors). 
48.  See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 2. As Professor Ackerman demonstrates, the racial 
transformation of the broader American culture was not done in a single stroke, but in 
multiple attacks on racialized power however it was manifested: school segregation, housing 
discrimination, voting access and equality, intimate unions (as in Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967)), and employment. 
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democracy while remaining critical of those social movements that do not 
enhance the democratic potential in society. 
Demosprudence expands beyond litigation-centric social change, which is 
often driven by national elites. Demosprudence, however, is not a critique of 
tactical litigation per se, but of the tendency of litigation to migrate from tactics 
to strategic centrality in theories of change.49 In fact, questions about the 
proper role of the courts in this process are intentionally secondary. Instead, 
the principal question is how do courts and social movements influence each 
other to interpret the meaning of law? The power of social movements stems 
from their ability to mount collective challenges by drawing on social 
networks, common purposes, and shared cultural frameworks. Social 
movements may expand the capacity of previously excluded or marginalized 
members of a polity to narrate constitutional meaning despite their numerically 
or politically weak position in a majoritarian democracy. In particular, the 
recursive relationship between social movements and law can expand the field 
on which the formal institutions of the society (courts and legislatures, for 
example) function most effectively as democracy-enhancing venues. 
B. Social Movements Are Different from Interest Groups 
As we hope to demonstrate through the examples of the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), and the United 
Farm Workers (UFW) in California, social movements are one way that 
minorities in a majoritarian democracy protect their rights by creating a 
constitutional crawl space in which they forge new understandings of the 
 
49.  Litigation is an essential tactic for social movements. However, litigators too often use state 
power in service of a principle rather than using principle in service of resistance to state 
power or other concentrations of power that undermine democracy. Causes are adjudicated 
into grievances; constituencies of accountability are demobilized. Litigation, especially high-
stakes litigation, often produces both mobilization and backlash in some measure. This is 
especially true in a political culture like ours where law is understood to mediate profoundly 
different cultures through a universalizing discourse. This universalizing process is 
especially complex where law is presumed to perform that function largely through the 
dynamic of neutrality (whether this is expressed through the language of rights or through 
the institutional limitations on the exercise of state power). See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 14, 
at 138-66. But see Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
715, 715-16, 729-43 (1992) (reviewing ROSENBERG, supra note 14) (arguing that impact 
litigation may be more effective at provoking change than some critics suggest and 
discussing “top-down” versus “bottom-up” approaches, as well as “court-centered” versus 
“dispute-centered” analyses). Thus, our critique of litigation, which we shall develop further 
in the context of both the civil rights and farmworkers movements, is based on the failure of 
many cause lawyers to formulate their strategy in conjunction with cycles of mobilization. 
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status quo. From that space, social movements challenge, and, if successful, 
change governing norms, creating an alternative narrative of constitutional 
meaning. The goal of demosprudence is to understand the ways that social 
movements enable those who are shut out of a majoritarian political process to 
nonetheless open up nodes in the decision-making practices of a democratic 
society. 
We want to make it clear that social movements are not the same as interest 
groups, although there may be some overlap. The principal difference for us is 
that interest groups focus their attention on elites and are largely composed of 
elites or elite surrogates. Interest groups are also more likely to engage in 
conventional politics by trying to influence, in conventional ways, people who 
exercise state power. By contrast, a social movement echoes the collective 
voices of political protest or moral vision from the perspective of those for 
whom the normal channels of politics are often impervious to their needs. 
Social movements also are characterized by the centrality of “contentious 
politics” practiced by actors whose “core ‘indigenous population’ . . . tends to 
be ‘the nonpowerful, the nonwealthy and the nonfamous.’”50 Social 
movements arise when ordinary people join forces in confrontation with elites, 
authorities, and opponents to change the exercise and distribution of power. 
“[T]hey are animated by more radical aspirational visions of a different, better 
society.”51 Social movements build solidarity through “a sustained series of 
interactions between power holders and persons successfully claiming to speak 
on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation,” as well as through 
connective structures and shared identities that sustain collective action.52 They 
are more likely to engage in “disruptive, ‘symbolic’ tactics such as protests, 
marches, strikes, and the like that halt or upset ongoing social practices.”53 
Social movements tend to emerge initially as a local source of power and 
moral authority. Social movements create constituencies of accountability and 
alternative authoritative interpretive communities that draw on local resources 
(networks, information, relationships, and cultural symbols) to ground the 
 
50.  Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND 
SOCIETY 506, 509 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004). 
51.  Id. at 509. 
52.  See TILLY & TARROW, supra note 6, at 4. Sidney Tarrow defines social movements as 
consisting of four elements: (1) collective challenges, based on (2) common purposes and 
(3) social solidarity in (4) sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities. 
Social movements are “groups possessing a purposive organization, whose leaders identify 
their goals with the preferences of an unmobilized constituency which they attempt to 
mobilize in direct action in relation to a target of influence in the political system.” Id. 
53.  McCann, supra note 50, at 509. 
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lawmaking process in a moral vision that forces both their legal advocates and 
the larger society to begin to contend with issues of substantive justice. As they 
grow, social movements monitor the translation function of law, by telling 
stories that provide a bridge, as Robert Cover suggests, linking lived 
experience to an imagined alternative.54 
Social movements may ultimately succeed by changing public opinion.55 Or 
minorities—through social movements—can attract more supporters, influence 
a political majority, and thus succeed in conventional politics through their 
disproportionate and concentrated attention on gaining access to legislation or 
the executive branch (e.g., the women’s rights movement leading to the 
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment or the Christian Right in the election of 
George W. Bush).56 Demosprudence is an attempt to understand the recursive 
dynamic at work. Social movements influence lawmaking, which then shapes 
the agenda of the social movement, etc. Nevertheless, it is crucial to recognize 
that most social movements do not prevail on their own or in conventional 
terms. 
Yet even when they fail, social movements may still provide a valuable 
window on lawmaking because they bring to the fore conceptions of 
substantive justice, not just procedural fairness. Social movements, whether of 
the political right or left, help narrate new social meanings, often through their 
interaction with, and resistance to, more conventional understandings. By 
contrast, lawyer-driven lawmaking is tied to precedent and thus depends on 
conventional understandings as a point of departure.57 Litigation, for example, 
 
54.  Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 4, 19 (1983). 
55.  See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement 
Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 
(2006). 
56.  Our reference to the women’s suffrage movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries as a movement of a “minority” does not, of course, ignore the numerical 
percentage of women; it merely cabins the movement to a subset of women and their male 
supporters in gaining women the right to vote. 
57.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 843 (1992) (“Liberty finds no 
refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our holding that the Constitution 
protects a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy in its early stages, that definition of 
liberty is still questioned.” (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973))); Jeremy Waldron, 
Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2012). Yet even 
this central obligation is currently contested. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Clarence Thomas’s 
Disgraceful Silence, NEW YORKER: DAILY COMMENT (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.newyorker 
.com/online/blogs/comment/2014/02/clarence-thomas-disgraceful-silence.html; Editorial, 
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attempts to vindicate established legal principles in a specific case. Legislation, 
by contrast, often seeks to articulate new principles through the passage of a 
statute. Whether through litigation or legislation, these principles are then 
often captured in the language of rights to represent the current expression of 
durable commitments that we make to each other.58 But the declaration of a 
new statutory or judicially determined right alone is neither self-enforcing nor 
culture shifting.59 By themselves, rights do not offer a path out of the morass; 
they inspire people to stand up for their dignity but rights—even when clearly 
stated—do not necessarily articulate either an enforceable set of policies or a 
vision of the better society.60 To be sustainable and compelling, the declaration 
of rights needs to be connected to remedies as well as to the lived experience of 
those on whose behalf they are named by shifting norms of fairness and justice, 
not just changing the rules governing their conduct or status. 
Thus, we have two interrelated goals in introducing the term 
demosprudence. First, we aim to enrich the conventional social movement 
literature by taking stock of the ways lawyers and judges influence and are 
influenced by the shape and direction of popular mobilizations. Much of the 
sociological literature, for example, explores social movements independently 
of their actual lawmaking role. Second, we hope to expand the lexicon of 
lawmaking itself to acknowledge the work of social movement actors. Courts 
and legislatures are not the sole expositors of constitutional or legal meaning. 
The dynamic equilibrium of power does not just circulate within a privileged, 
technically savvy, or influential elite. 
Citizens are not only sources of constitutional meaning; mobilized 
constituencies are also resources for the protection of constitutional rights and 
 
Clarence Thomas’s Brand of Judicial Logic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes 
.com/2011/10/23/opinion/sunday/clarence-thomass-brand-of-judicial-logic.html. 
58.  Of course, this is only one definition of “rights,” but it is an attempt to capture the social 
content of rights rather than just the individual experience of having a “right.” We are using 
“rights” as a non-legal expert might understand them. By “social content,” we mean the 
shared understanding of what might conventionally, by legal experts, be described as 
Hohfeldian categories. See, e.g., Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1916). 
59.  For a definition of culture shifting, see Stoddard, supra note 10 (arguing that culture shifting 
changes widely shared norms and commitments, while rule shifting, by contrast, changes 
the rules but does not necessarily assure enforcement of, or respect for, those rules). 
60.  Id.; see also JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS 
(2007) (describing the potential derived from the intersection of immigrant workers and 
union organizing, particularly non-traditional forms of organization); Jennifer Gordon, We 
Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for 
Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 407-10, 428-45 (1995). 
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constitutional meaning.61 Demosprudence examines this interdependence 
between lawmaking and social movements by rethinking the way mobilized 
constituencies, often at the local level, challenge basic constitutive 
understandings of justice in our democracy. Rather than deferring to 
appointed judges as the preeminent authority for understanding or applying 
the Constitution, these local movements often introduce new sources  
of interpretative authority that ultimately change the cultural norms of the 
larger society. 
We believe that social movement activism is as much a source of law as are 
statutes and judicial decisions. Even those cause lawyers, whose goals are 
consistent with the highest calling of their profession and our democracy, still 
tend to think primarily if not exclusively in terms of their own professional 
tools for lawmaking. By contrast, we seek to make analytic space for 
lawmaking that is the work of mobilized citizens in conjunction with, not 
separate from, legal professionals. 
For example, at the first mass meeting in Montgomery, Alabama, following 
the arraignment of Rosa Parks for refusing to move to the back of the bus, 
Martin Luther King, Jr. declared, “We are here because of our love for 
democracy, because of our deep-seated belief that democracy transformed from 
thin paper to thick action is the greatest form of government on earth.”62 
King’s message was that democracy is not the captive of a legal document; it is 
a practice. And it is a practice that was authorized by the original Constitution, 
 
61.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Beaumont, Reviving the Republican Face of Constitutional Rights: 
Abolition as a Constitutional Project 10 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www 
.polisci.umn.edu/assets/pdf/Beaumont-PTColloq10-08.pdf. Beaumont calls this process 
“public guardianship.” Id. at 1. According to Beaumont, “We, the People,” have, can, and 
should engage in  
immanent criticism, which exposes constitutional contradictions, paradoxes, 
failures, or hypocrisy by pointing to conflicts between existing constitutional 
principles or practices; creative reimagination, which offers new understandings 
of constitutional rights, principles, and structure; and reinvention, 
reconstruction, or refounding, which tries to implement, institutionalize, ratify, 
or otherwise set in political motion a new framework of rights and 
constitutionalism. 
Id. at 8. Beaumont then offers an in-depth study of abolition within its historical context as 
an example of “public guardianship.” However, the change-making capacity of mobilized 
constituencies is not restricted to the actions of legal citizens, as demonstrated by Jennifer 
Gordon’s use of the term “non-citizen citizens.” GORDON, supra note 60, at 237. 
62.  Martin Luther King, Jr., Address to First Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA) 
Mass Meeting (Dec. 5, 1955), http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/kingweb/publications 
/speeches/MIA_mass_meeting_at_holt_street.html. 
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as amended and as then interpreted in 1954 by the Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Board of Education.63 
But King did not rely solely on the Court. He relied on a higher moral 
authority when he added, “If we are wrong, God Almighty is wrong,” thus 
joining the idiom of religious values to the legal principles articulated by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown.64 This fusion of national law and religious 
authority was key in convincing blacks in Montgomery in 1955 that their anger 
over Jim Crow seating on the city buses was both righteous and legitimate. It 
helped persuade blacks that their civic dignity demanded that they boycott 
those buses. Through “thick action,” they would help the United States realize 
the true faith of democracy. Nine years later, Fannie Lou Hamer joined her 
own biography to those of fellow members of the Mississippi Freedom 
Democratic Party when she spoke to the Democratic Party and a national 
television audience about all the beatings she withstood in order to exercise the 
fundamental right to vote. Her narrative was about physical courage that was 
only possible when it was backed by a collective commitment. For Hamer, 
“thick action” meant rejecting a compromise proposed by the Democratic Party 
elite that would have allowed the segregationist Mississippi Democrats to be 
seated at the convention as the official representatives of Mississippi. All the 
MFDP would get would be the symbolic presence of two non-voting delegates. 
For Hamer, that was no compromise at all. 
In this excerpt from our project, we make three preliminary points. First, 
we examine the processes, outputs, and stories of collective representation as a 
democratic process because that is one place where higher lawmaking finds its 
legitimacy in a democracy. Second, we scrutinize the interaction between the 
repertoires of those outsiders seeking access to power and those regulating that 
access, in order to comprehend and appreciate the dynamics of what makes 
social movements an instrument of lawmaking and also a vital force in our 
democracy. Third, we explore the role of social movement activists in 
transforming the ways in which lawyers represent their clients. The stories of 
the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, the Montgomery Bus Boycott, and 
the United Farm Workers are exemplary of these points. In addition, these 
stories highlight the processes that Professor Ackerman details. By focusing on 
the ways in which the Court intervened and on the arguments marshaled on 
behalf of civil rights activists, Professor Ackerman illustrates the recursive 
 
63.  See Gerald Torres & Lani Guinier, The Constitutional Imaginary: Just Stories About We the 
People, 71 MD. L. REV. 1052, 1064-66 (2012) (providing a longer critique of framework 
originalism in JACK BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
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processes necessary to generate substantial and durable legal change. He also 
illustrates the ways in which these changes, unless solidified by concerted social 
action, remain vulnerable to the forces of retrenchment. 
i .  nomos and narrative:  all of us is  tired 
“We didn’t come all this way for no two seats . . . all of us is tired.”65 
In August 1964, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party challenged the 
right of the all-white segregationist Mississippi Democratic Party to represent 
Mississippi at the Democratic National Convention. The Freedom Democratic 
Party, an insurgent organization open to all Mississippians, arrived in Atlantic 
City poised to make a public stand against segregation. Its delegation, 
including Fannie Lou Hamer, Victoria Jackson Gray, and Annie Devine, was 
composed of ministers, farmers, sharecroppers, domestics, and the 
unemployed. Activists spanned the Mississippi black community, and they 
demanded to be seated at the convention as official Mississippi delegates. 
The party was founded in the spring of 1964 after unsuccessful attempts to 
secure black participation in the local branches of the Democratic Party66 and 
in the midst of a violent backlash in Mississippi against the gains that were 
being made nationally, such as the civil rights bill of 1963 (signed into law as 
the Civil Rights Act in 1964). Telling the Credentials Committee at the 
Democratic National Convention why they created the MFDP, Hamer 
explained: 
We formed our own party because the whites wouldn’t even let us 
register. . . . We followed all the laws that the white people themselves 
made. We tried to attend the precinct meetings and they locked the 
doors on us or moved the meetings and that’s against the laws they 
made for their ownselves. So we were the ones that held the real 
precinct meetings. At all these meetings across the state we elected our 
representatives, to go to the National Democratic Convention in 
Atlantic City. But we learned the hard way that even though we had all 
 
65.  This is how Fannie Lou Hamer reportedly responded to the Democratic National 
Committee’s offer of two seats to the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party at the 1964 
Democratic National Convention. See Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for 
Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1414 (1991). 
66.  PAYNE, supra note 24, at 321. 
  
changing the wind 
2763 
 
the law and all the righteousness on our side—that white man is not 
going to give up his power to us.67 
Earlier, on August 6, 1964, the MFDP had held its state convention in 
Jackson and nearly 2,500 filled the Masonic Temple. Joseph Rauh, a leader of 
the Democratic Party’s liberal wing and MFDP’s attorney, told the crowd that 
the MFDP would first present its case to be seated at the Democratic National 
Convention later that month by arguing to the Credentials Committee that 
blacks had been excluded from the “regular” state Democratic Party and that 
the MFDP was the only party in the state loyal to the national ticket. He 
assured the gathering that chances for success were excellent. At the August 6 
convention, the delegates elected Lawrence Guyot as MFDP chair, Aaron 
Henry as chair of the delegation, and Fannie Lou Hamer as vice-chair. Victoria 
Gray and Ed King were representatives to the Democratic National 
Committee.68 
By 1964, black Mississippians had proven their mettle over and over again 
in trying to exercise their democratic rights as citizens. In the 1946 statewide 
primary, Vernando R. Collier, a thirty-six-year-old army veteran and president 
of the NAACP’s Gulfport branch, arrived at city hall with his wife to vote. He 
was knocked down, dragged to the front porch, and thrown out. His wife was 
assaulted while a police officer on the scene walked by as if nothing had 
happened.69 When Collier later requested federal protection from the FBI so 
that he might vote, the FBI agent informed him: “It is not our job to give 
protection, only to investigate.”70 
As the decades rolled by, violent white resistance to black voting continued. 
The Southern senators who dominated the Judiciary Committee in the U.S. 
Senate had used their clout to secure the appointment of segregationist judges 
to the federal courts.71 As a result, black Mississippi citizens could not rely on 
the federal judiciary to protect their right to vote. Yet voting for blacks was not 
just a matter of right and respect. It was a matter of life and death. 
 
67.  FANNIE LOU HAMER, TO PRAISE OUR BRIDGES: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1967), excerpted in THE 
EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER: DOCUMENTS, SPEECHES, AND FIRSTHAND 
ACCOUNTS FROM THE BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE 176, 178-79 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 
1991). 
68.  Id. 
69.  JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI 5 (1994). 
70.  See PATRICIA SULLIVAN, LIFT EVERY VOICE: THE NAACP AND THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 318 (2009). 
71.  THE EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER, supra note 67, at 69. 
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In 1961, Gerald Stern, a young Jewish lawyer from Memphis, Tennessee, 
joined the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department. He was assigned to 
investigate voter discrimination and intimidation in Mississippi. Stern made 
his way through the back roads of Mississippi. He came upon Moses McGee, 
an elderly black man, plowing his fields behind a mule with the plow lines 
hitched over his shoulders. Without a word, McGee unhitched himself, went 
to his shack, cleaned up, and then returned to talk. As McGee explained to 
Stern, “It’s not right for anyone to be seen as an animal. I want you to see me 
as a human being.”72 
McGee wanted blacks to get the right to vote so they could force the county 
supervisors to pave the roads leading to black people’s homes like they paved 
the roads to white men’s homes. For example, when it rained, the dirt roads 
became impassable. He recounted an occasion when a black baby who fell ill 
died because no doctor could reach him over those impassable roads. He 
carried the baby in his arms for miles over the hills to get to town. The baby 
died in his arms before he could get there.73 
McGee said John Hardy had accompanied Edith Simmons Peters and 
Lucius Wilson, both of whom were elderly and owned large farms, to register 
to vote.74 “When the registrar saw Hardy, he . . . got a gun from his desk, and 
ordered him to leave.” When Hardy turned to go, the registrar “struck him on 
the back of the head with his gun, saying, ‘Get out of here you damn son-of-a-
bitch and don’t come back in here.’”75 A bleeding Hardy encountered the 
sheriff shortly after, but when he told the sheriff what had happened he was 
arrested for “disturbing the peace and bringing an uprising among the 
people.”76 
Hardy’s case was later dropped, but when Stern requested that Federal 
District Court Judge Elijah Cox order Walthall County to cease discriminating 
against black voters, Cox rejected Stern’s motion. According to Cox, only two 
 
72.  Gerald M. Stern, Mississippi, in OUTSIDE THE LAW: NARRATIVES ON JUSTICE IN AMERICA 164 
(Susan Richards Shreve & Porter Shreve eds., 1997). 
73.  Id. at 165. 
74.  John Hardy was “a young black college student from Nashville, Tennessee,” who, “along 
with some other students, set up a voter registration school” in the county. Every evening 
for three weeks they taught Walthall County residents “how to fill out registration forms 
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of the 2,490 blacks in the county were registered to vote because blacks “have 
not been interested in registering to vote.”77 
On May 30, 1964, local police stopped Otha Williams, a businessman and 
farmer, and beat him severely. Four days later, the Council of Federated 
Organizations office in Jackson was fired at, shattering the plate-glass front 
and injuring several workers inside. In that same week, two black men and one 
black woman were found dead in a car near Woodville.78 
Like the rest of the black population of Mississippi, many of the MFDP 
delegates had faced their own hardships. Fannie Lou Hamer was born on 
October 6, 1917 in Montgomery County, Mississippi, and moved to Sunflower 
County when she was two years old.79 She was the last of twenty children born 
to sharecroppers.80 In 1962, Hamer was working on the Marlowe Plantation 
outside Ruleville, where she and her husband had both worked for eighteen 
years; she was first a field worker and then became the plantation timekeeper.81 
She had, by her own words, a reputation for not having good sense—that is, 
having the guts to complain about inhumane conditions ill-advisedly.82 
According to Hamer, her activism began when her pastor announced a 
mass meeting to discuss registration and her friend convinced her to attend.83 
It was there she first learned that a “Negro” could register and vote. She 
volunteered to go to the courthouse the next day. She reflected, in retrospect, 
that perhaps she should have been scared, but, “[t]he only thing they could do 
to me was kill me and it seemed like they’d been trying to do that a little bit at a 
time ever since I could remember.”84 
Her attempt to register was unsuccessful and when she returned to the 
plantation, an enraged Marlowe demanded she withdraw her application or 
leave the plantation. She defied him with, “I didn’t try to register for you. I 
 
77.  Id. at 166. 
78.  DITTMER, supra note 69, at 237. Bob Moses, Aaron Henry, and David Dennis wrote to 
President Johnson, requesting a meeting on June 18 or 19 to “discuss preparations for the 
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tried to register for myself” and left that very night.85 Ten days later, 
nightriders fired into the home of Mary Tucker in Ruleville, where Hamer was 
staying. The winter was rough for the Hamers. Neither could get a job but 
somehow they got through it and Hamer became more deeply involved in the 
movement, teaching citizenship classes for the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC).86 
Hamer’s courage was extraordinary. She was also a charismatic speaker. In 
1967, Robert Jackall, then a young professor of sociology at Georgetown 
University, spent part of the spring and summer working in Sunflower 
County. In an essay years later, he claimed he had seen true charisma only once 
when, in a flagging mass meeting, Hamer stood to speak: 
Immediately, an electric atmosphere suffused the entire church. Men 
and women alike began to stand up, to call out her name, and to urge 
her on . . . . She went on to speak about the moral evil of racism itself 
and the grievous harm it was doing to the souls of white people in 
Mississippi . . . . She did not do so in accusation, but with a kind of 
redemptive reconciliation . . . . She ended by leading the assembly in 
chorus after chorus of . . . “This Little Light of Mine.” When she 
finished, the entire assembly was deeply shaken emotionally. People 
crowded around her to promise they would join the struggle.87  
And Hamer would hold them to those commitments after the meeting.88 
By the end of August 1964, Hamer’s charisma catapulted her into public 
prominence during her testimony before the Credentials Committee of the 
Democratic National Convention. With unvarnished detail, she described one 
of the beatings she suffered while trying to register to vote. In June 1963, in 
Winona, Mississippi, Hamer and others were on the way back from SCLC 
citizenship school in Charleston, South Carolina. The group was arrested and 
Hamer was carried out of one cell into another cell where there were “two 
Negro prisoners”: 
The State Highway Patrolmen ordered the first Negro to take the 
blackjack. 
 
85.  Fannie Lou Hamer, Testimony Before the Credentials Committee, Democratic National 
Convention (Aug. 22, 1964), in SAY IT PLAIN: A CENTURY OF GREAT AFRICAN AMERICAN 
SPEECHES 49, 51 (Catherine Ellis & Stephen Drury Smith eds., 2007) [hereinafter Hamer 
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86.  PAYNE, supra note 24, at 155. 
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The first Negro prisoner ordered me . . . to lay down on a bunk bed 
on my face. 
I laid on my face and the first Negro began to beat. I was beat by 
the first Negro until he was exhausted. I was holding my hands behind 
me at that time on my left side, because I suffered from polio when I 
was six years old. 
After the first Negro had beat until he was exhausted, the State 
Highway Patrolman ordered the second Negro to take the blackjack. 
The second Negro began to beat and I began to work my feet, and 
the State Highway Patrolman ordered the first Negro who had beat me 
to sit on my feet—to keep me from working my feet. I began to scream 
and one white man got up and began to beat me in my head and tell me 
to hush.89 
In her words, “when they turned me loose, I was hard as a bone.”90  
The testimony of this straight-talking, plainspoken black sharecropper gave 
the MFDP’s fight a sense of moral urgency. Hamer was, in the words of Robert 
Jackall, “devoid of all pretence” with an “unshakeable conviction in the justness 
of her cause, proved by her personal physical sufferings and the risks she 
continued to take.” She had learned to “articulate her ideas with a powerful 
religious rhetoric that had deep resonance for her audience but that had no 
trace of practiced cant.”91 Hamer was such a compelling public presence that 
Lyndon Johnson “once called a news conference solely to stop television 
coverage of her.”92 
Hamer mesmerized a national television audience at the 1964 Democratic 
National Convention with her stark but riveting description of the struggle to 
register to vote. However, Hamer’s physical sacrifice and spellbinding 
performance were not enough to convince either Lyndon Johnson, the 
Democratic Party’s presidential candidate, or Hubert Humphrey, its eventual 
vice-presidential candidate, to take on the state segregationists in a face-off 
with the Freedom Democrats. Instead, the Democratic national party leaders 
cobbled together a compromise: they would pledge to ban segregation at 
future conventions, but for now, the MFDP would have to settle for two seats 
as at-large delegates. 
 
89.  Hamer Testimony, supra note 85, at 53. 
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Hamer and the other MFDP delegates rejected the compromise. As Bob 
Moses explained, “What is the compromise? We are here for the people and 
the people want to represent themselves. They don’t want symbolic token 
votes. They want to vote themselves.”93 In the end, the Freedom Democratic 
Party refused to be placated: Hamer said simply, but firmly, “We didn’t come 
all this way for no two seats, ’cause all of us is tired.”94 
Fannie Lou Hamer’s convention speech was political theater in service of a 
profound challenge to both the national and the local party’s understandings of 
democracy. According to Bob Moses, “the whole point of the MFDP is to teach 
the lowest sharecropper that he knows better than the biggest leader exactly 
what is required to make a decent life for himself.”95 The composition of the 
delegation of the MFDP—where the constituents were the leaders—was 
emblematic of the changes necessary to make Mississippi, and indeed the rest 
of the South, more democratic. By taking the fight to the Democratic Party 
they announced that this was a challenge to the nation as a whole and not a 
mere sectional defect. 
Hamer spoke to the nation on behalf of an organized and mobilized 
constituency that reimagined the structure of democratic representation. The 
MFDP didn’t travel from Mississippi just to play normal politics. The MFDP 
came to Atlantic City to contest the way in which representation was 
understood. They were not just there to be able to get a seat on the floor, but to 
dispute the legitimacy by which the seats were allocated. Hamer and the other 
MFDP delegates were clear. Their role in democratic life should be taken 
seriously. For the MFDP, this was a moral not just a political struggle. As 
MFDP delegate Unita Blackwell explained: 
The whole issue around the compromise for us and for me was that it 
was some kind of political ploy that they understood but for us, for 
Mississippi, it was what was right and what was wrong. It was we had 
been done wrong. Our rights had been taken away, and you just 
couldn’t issue some two seats at large to correct that. And it was a moral 
situation that had to be righted. So it was not just a political something 
to get away with, is that we sit in the rooms and negotiate. You know, 
they knew about those kind of things, but we didn’t. How to sit in the 
rooms and negotiate away and say, “You know, we’ll take the best of 
this, a piece of that.” We went after what was right, and it was wrong, 
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the way we had been treated for hundreds and hundreds of years; 
denied the right to register to vote, denied the right to participate in the 
political process, and that’s what was going on.96 
“We’re not here to bring politics to our morality but to bring morality to 
our politics,”97 Moses said to the delegates informing them that it was their 
decision to make when confronted with the “compromise” proffered by the 
Democratic National Committee. Bob Moses, Aaron Henry, and Ed King had 
been in a meeting with Herbert Humphrey, Walter Reuther, Bayard Rustin, 
Martin Luther King, Jr., and several other representatives of SCLC and the 
Johnson Administration to hammer out the announced compromise. Moses, 
Henry, and Ed King would not agree to the settlement, maintaining that it was 
up to the entire delegation to decide. Later, when the delegation caucused to 
revisit the issue of the compromise, Moses reminded the delegates that it was 
up to them to decide.98 
For Joe Rauh, MFDP’s attorney, it was a different matter. He knew the 
game of politics. He arrived at the Democratic National Convention as an 
insider. He held one of its 110 votes as a delegate from the District of Columbia 
and “faced the Credentials Committee as a comfortable peer.”99 At the MFDP 
state convention in Jackson on August 6, 1964, Rauh had assured the gathering 
that “chances for success were excellent.”100 His written briefs revealed the 
push for a pragmatic solution based on his knowledge of the way things 
worked. He cited “twenty-six major credentials contests” dating back to 1836, 
all of which had been resolved by splitting the prize. In particular, he cited the 
Texas case of 1944 when a faceoff between New Deal loyalists and Texas 
regulars resulted in both groups being seated with half votes apiece.101 
His MFDP clients had charged him to bargain for nothing less than what 
other challengers had gotten: shared seats with the regulars. Yet, Rauh 
expressed enthusiasm for the two-seat compromise, focusing on the 
practicalities of negotiation and bargaining rather than justice, law, and the 
rights of black Mississippians to participate. In an interview at the Convention, 
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shortly after the announcement of the compromise, a self-satisfied Rauh 
declared: 
We’ve got an offer to our people, we’ve got a great deal out of this. I 
think to call this a loss is a bad . . . is a bad mistake. I think we’ve made 
a terrific gain. You always talk “no compromise” in a Convention until 
you get the best you can then you quit.102 
When asked whether the MFDP leaders were satisfied, he responded: “I don’t 
think so and I don’t blame them. Nobody ever gets all they want. The leaders 
of the regulars [white Democratic Party officials] aren’t satisfied either. They’re 
going back to Jackson.”103 
Joseph Rauh, the well-connected, liberal, Washington, D.C.-based white 
lawyer for the MFDP, played a key role in behind-the-scenes negotiation. Rauh 
understood the necessity of moving the national leaders who were unconnected 
with the grassroots movement, yet he seemed to assume that the compromises 
that he was working out would be acceptable if both sides could see them as 
reasonable. Had the MFDP been given more agency in orchestrating the terms 
of the compromise, the MFDP delegates, in Rauh’s eyes, would have been 
mollified. Rauh and his ilk were concerned with state power, but they failed to 
realize that the MFDP’s challenge to state power came from outside the 
precincts of normal politics.104 
Rauh had several “masters.” He was beholden to national unions, to 
preserving access to elite decision makers, and he also sincerely wanted to help 
blacks in Mississippi. Unlike Bob Moses, who was also an outsider, Rauh never 
integrated himself into the community. But most importantly, and despite his 
genuine commitment to the MFDP cause, Rauh misunderstood the power of 
the MFDP, which he tried to channel into conventional deal-making. The 
MFDP power came from the evident justice of their claim that the Mississippi 
delegation was patently illegitimate. Their position was not about 
accommodating two reasonable sides to a political contest. They saw this as a 
right side and a wrong side. The meaning of democratic participation meant 
seating the truly legitimate party, the one party that offered to represent 
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everyone. The challenge was not about getting the best deal; the challenge was 
not to abandon fundamental values. 
Unlike Joseph Rauh, Bob Moses’s leadership style reflected the 
understanding that his authority came from the people and he refused to 
impose what he thought best upon them. Rauh would later claim that he was 
shut out of the discussion during which the compromise was forged. 
Nevertheless, the civil rights activists at the convention felt betrayed by their 
attorney. As far as they were concerned, it was all a ploy. A deal had been 
struck in the dead of the night. Nevertheless, Rauh told his clients nothing new 
had emerged and went to the Credentials Committee meeting knowing a deal 
had already been made.105 Whatever the truth, it is telling that Rauh even 
thought such a deal could be made. Rauh, legal counsel for the United Auto 
Workers, told UAW President Walter Reuther that the compromise was a 
“great proposal” but that he could not vote for the proposal, nor could he 
endorse the compromise within the party chiefs, without the approval and 
support of Aaron Henry and the MFDP. If Henry gave his consent, Rauh 
would endorse the compromise before the Credentials Committee. The 
problem was that while Rauh believed in Henry’s legitimacy, the compromise 
did not have the consent of the entire MFDP delegation.106 
The compromise was announced while Moses was still meeting with 
Humphrey, Reuther, and the others. Moses subsequently shrieked at 
Humphrey and Reuther, “You cheated!”107 Rauh was more charitable with his 
friend Humphrey, “the dumb bastards on your side—and I’m sure it wasn’t 
you, Hubert—chose our two people instead of letting them choose their own 
two people.”108 And Rauh urged the MFDP delegates to accept the compromise 
saying that, in his view, the two seats represented a victory.109 Though he later 
marched dutifully to the convention podium to return the unused at-large 
delegate credentials issued for Aaron Henry and Ed King, he shed tears of 
regret. He was troubled, not so much by falling short of the goal of 
representation for his clients, as by losing the trust of Moses, which would 
haunt him for years.110 
What Rauh did not grasp is that Hamer and Moses had a vision of 
democracy that did not begin and end with “politics” or with “put[ting] a 
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point over.” Moreover, the MFDP did more than represent a broader and more 
participatory view of democracy. As an uneducated though eloquent 
sharecropper, Hamer’s mere presence—televised to the nation—put 
conventional ideas about leadership in jeopardy, as well. Hamer and the other 
delegates of the MFDP sought to expand the democratic potential in 
Mississippi and in Atlantic City by saying that the right to participate belonged 
to all, not just to those deemed qualified by elites, whether black or white. 
Merely securing the right to vote, or gaining access to a convention seat for two 
“representatives,” was not the same as “freedom.” “By representing the poorest 
of Mississippi’s residents, people without the ‘qualifications’ that accompanied 
middle-class status, the MFDP repudiated traditional criteria of leadership.”111 
This fight was not about abstract rights for invisible people. Voting rights 
were a precondition to mobilization, not its end. The goal was to organize, to 
develop the power of the local people to change their own circumstances. As 
Mississippi activist Lawrence Guyot explained, voting rights assure the right to 
begin to fight “in the way we want to fight.”112 And the way they wanted to 
fight involved ordinary people speaking for themselves. 
By contrast, Roy Wilkins and Lyndon Johnson wanted Fannie Lou Hamer 
back in Mississippi or at least off center stage. Similarly, a few black ministers 
in SCLC agreed with prominent leaders of mainstream civil rights 
organizations that high-profile positions should be reserved for those who 
would be received most sympathetically by Northern whites and liberal allies. 
Under a media spotlight, illiterate blacks might undermine “qualified” blacks’ 
ability to gain the rights they deserved. This was especially worrisome for those 
who wanted to use the movement as a personal passport to respectability and 
as an opportunity for individual exit.113 The historic sectional dispute and 
political alignment that gave the South to the Democratic Party was being 
renegotiated on the floor inside and outside the convention as well as in the 
backrooms and replayed on national television. While the big dogs bickered, 
the moral force of the MFDP, which had made the credentials contest an issue 
of national importance in the first place, got lost. 
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The dominance of elite thought reveals a tension in the ways even the most 
sympathetic elites “represent” non-elites at the moment of action. For example, 
Martin Luther King, Jr. lobbied for the compromise and against it 
simultaneously. When King weighed in privately on the proposed two 
delegate-at-large seat plan proffered by the National Democratic Party, he gave 
explicit voice to his multi-dimensional role. Speaking to Fannie Lou Hamer, 
Victoria Jackson Gray, Annie Devine, and the other MFDP delegates about the 
compromise, King acknowledged the oppressive conditions facing black people 
in Mississippi. He also admitted the burden he felt as a national figure whose 
influence depended to a large measure on his ability to preserve and move the 
good will of other national leaders. Yet, because he understood that his 
national standing also depended on the trust of local black people in 
Mississippi, in trying to balance the competing pressures, King equivocated. 
“So, being a Negro leader, I want you to take this, but if I were a Mississippi 
Negro, I would vote against it.”114 With that one sentence King was the 
MFDP’s “mirror,” its delegate, and its trustee. He was the descriptive 
representative who represented the MFDP members because he looked like 
them, shared much of their historical ancestry, and was familiar with their 
experience; he could serve as their delegate by acting as an agent for the 
MFDP’s expressed wishes; yet he was also their trustee who acted on behalf of 
the MFDP by following his own conscience.115 
In contrast to King’s equivocation, it was the courage and clarity of Fannie 
Lou Hamer and Bob Moses that directly challenged the lack of leadership in 
the Democratic Party establishment, including Lyndon Johnson and Hubert 
Humphrey. Hamer and Moses embodied an implicit conception of 
representation that was at odds with the model being offered to the MFDP. It 
was also at odds with the contradictions in which King found himself trapped. 
Hamer’s and Moses’s clarity put into play the question of Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s embrace of the three traditional faces of representation: the mirror, 
the delegate, and the trustee. Those traditional faces describe important ways 
in which leaders represent followers, politicians represent constituents, and 
lawyers represent clients. But Hamer and the others refused to cooperate with 
the traditional role assigned to them. Hamer was not the mere delegate to 
King’s Hamlet. King felt as though he had two sources of authority: the 
mobilized community in Mississippi and his ability to whisper in the 
President’s ear. That tension was both intoxicating and confusing and left him 
 
114.  BRANCH, supra note 97, at 473. 
115.  See A. Michael Froomkin, Climbing the Most Dangerous Branch: Legisprudence and the New 
Legal Process, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1071, 1073-74 (1988) (book review) (citing Eskridge and 
Frickey’s adaptation of Hanna Pitkin’s three metaphors for representational theory). 
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trying to guard both sources of his power. By attempting to serve two masters, 
King sought to preserve his own status as an individual power broker. Hamer, 
however, was clear where her power and authority came from. She was 
speaking for, to, and with every Mississippi Negro who took the promise of 
democracy seriously. 
Hamer and King had different goals for their power, as well. She was not 
interested in two seats and by her resistance transformed thin paper promises 
into thick action. While acknowledging the importance of King’s personal 
magnetism and his access to elites, Hamer’s stand made the national leadership 
aware of a constituency that would try to hold them accountable to a larger 
vision of justice. Hamer’s stand was an exhortation as well as an implicit 
critique of King’s conception of representation and leadership. The role that 
Hamer played was exemplary of the capacity for members of a mobilized 
constituency to change the rules of the game and to hold those who would 
claim the mantle of leadership accountable. The test wasn’t whether King or 
the others could get the national elite of the Democratic Party (the President, 
the Vice-President, their lawyers, and others) to yield some temporary power; 
it was instead to suggest new reasons for why that elite was allowed to wield 
power in the name of those who suffered for democracy and who, with their 
resistance to white supremacy, put the norms of the Equal Protection Clause 
into effect. 
Hamer reminds us that King’s view of representation inhabits a dangerous 
territory to the extent that it reflects a status to be defended more than a 
dynamic relationship defined by its sources of accountability and legitimized 
by an accounting of the distribution of power. Where it is defined primarily as 
a status, representation misallocates power because it misrepresents the 
authority of an organized constituency to sanction, define, and defend social 
change. By characterizing this as misrepresentation, we mean that the 
relationship does not reflect the dynamic equilibrium of power that organized 
constituencies bring to the representational connection. By inviting new 
sources of information, energy, and vigilance to the making (and enforcement) 
of laws, these constituencies enhance the quality of democracy. 
In juxtaposing King’s ambivalence with Hamer’s and Moses’s 
steadfastness, we see how social movement actors can tell a competing story of 
democracy that reframes the idea of participation, the meaning of 
representation, and the sources of democratic authority. Hamer and the other 
MFDP delegates changed the idea of participation from an obligation to obey 
to an obligation to speak out. They were no longer content to be the passive 
objects of power; they became active subjects of legitimate authority. Hamer 
also embodied a different meaning of representation. Unlike King’s 
fundamental confusion as to the source of his power and to whom he was 
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obligated, Hamer rejected the offer of representation when it was presented as 
a bribe of individual access dressed up as power. Hamer’s conception of 
representation bound her to the community, which was a reservoir of their 
power, not hers. She knew that the source of her authority came from the 
struggle of the activists in Mississippi, rather than the boardrooms of 
Washington or any other polished corridor of power from which those 
activists, to be sure, would have been excluded. 
As a dynamic constituency, the MFDP was telling different stories: the 
meta story, the micro story, and the resonant story. The meta story is the one 
that explains all the others. It is the story that lays out a conception of justice 
and translates into one that others can hear and join. It invites their individual 
stories into a broader story. The micro story, by contrast, allows individuals to 
tell their “own” story. The sharing of these micro stories builds trust and 
provides motivation for action as well as a willingness to assume agency. The 
resonant story frame—e.g., “all of us is tired”—gives ordinary people, as well as 
sympathetic but non-movement listeners, a conceptual frame that can become 
part of the vernacular understanding of justice.116 As a mobilized constituency, 
the MFDP challenged the idea of representation itself, asking fundamental 
questions about who can speak for whom. 
However, the MFDP was not just telling stories of representation and 
accountability. The stories of its members also play an important role in 
understanding the wellspring of movement “successes.” They illustrate the 
vital role of the MFDP as an alternative interpretative community that helped 
drive rule shifts and changes in law. The MFDP—here exemplified by the 
person of Fannie Lou Hamer but also embodied in the actions of many of her 
cohorts—helped create obligations, not just new incentives for those with 
formal power to change the rules. True, their position did not result in a 
wholesale change of the 1964 convention rules. But, as a result of their 
challenge to the justification for the legitimate exercise of power, the formal 
rules of the Democratic Party ultimately changed because they excluded large 
numbers of the Democratic Party base. 
The MFDP, as an alternative interpretative community and a constituency 
of accountability, also created pressure external to the normal disciplinary 
techniques of access. The MFDP’s position provided the analysis that 
supported the organizing in Selma and elsewhere that ultimately pushed both 
King and Johnson to assume greater leadership in getting the Voting Rights 
 
116.  The image of Rosa Parks refusing to give up her seat is another example of a resonant 
frame. See infra Part II. 
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Act of 1965 passed.117 Although further organizing in Selma, in particular, was 
central to this process, the public challenge of the MFDP cannot be 
underestimated as an important precipitant to this fundamental reallocation of 
power between the federal and state governments for the supervision of voting 
rules throughout the South. With their protest at the Democratic National 
Convention the MFDP forced two issues to the fore: (1) whether they would be 
granted a role in the national party that claimed to represent their interests, and 
(2) whether they would even be allowed to vote as full citizens. The President 
and his party had to answer both questions. One could be elided with a deal 
and “inside baseball,” but the other could only be answered with a 
commitment to changing the ways in which elections were constructed 
throughout the South. This pressure and the amazing courage of the 
leadership from Mississippi and elsewhere, especially in Alabama, moved 
activists to demand action, and the President could not give them an answer 
with merely a personal assurance or a backroom deal. The marches in Selma 
and the blood spilled at the Edmund Pettus Bridge flowing together with the 
blood of Jimmie Lee Jackson created a pressure the President could not 
deflect.118 When President Johnson told King that it was “too soon” for a 
Voting Rights Act, he had not anticipated both the tenacity of those who 
wanted justice or the coiled violence of those who would deny it. He would 
have to mobilize his renowned political powers to move Congress to give him 
and the people the change they demanded. 
Fannie Lou Hamer and her MFDP associates exemplify an alternative but 
important source of lawmaking power that is not controlled entirely by 
elections, legislatures, executives, or courts.119 Just compare Joe Rauh’s 
combination of pragmatism and grandstanding to Unita Blackwell’s sense of 
righteous indignation and Bob Moses’s commitment to nurturing local 
leadership. Importantly, as we shall also see in the story of the Montgomery 
Bus Boycott, the fearless challenge to power by Moses, Hamer, and Blackwell 
helped change the background narratives of social life against which 
authoritative expressions of law are placed. The local MFDP members also 
 
117.  Of course, the Voting Rights Act has to be understood, to some extent, as an attempt by 
those in power to legitimate their continuing exercise of power. 
118.  Jimmie Lee Jackson was shot on February 18, 1964, protecting his mother during a night 
vigil to try to secure a right to vote six months after the Democratic National Convention. 
119.  In a democracy there are a number of interpretive communities with some claim to 
authority that can play a role in influencing the construction of social norms and which 
provide a narrative framework for understanding social life, upon which law must operate. 
One of the ways these communities do this is by creating and enacting stories of justice. In 
some ways the distinction between Brown and the Montgomery Bus Boycott is about the 
origin of the story—does it come from the courts or from the people? 
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functioned as a constituency of accountability that the national Democratic 
Party leaders could not ignore. 
We now turn to the Montgomery Bus Boycott to further examine some of 
the same issues—considering again the perspective and practice of lawyers who 
“represent” a dynamic constituency. 
i i .  the montgomery bus boycott 
On the night of December 5, 1955, Dr. King put succinctly the relationship 
between law on the books and law as experienced. Well before King became a 
“national” leader, he delivered his very first speech as head of the Montgomery 
Improvement Association (MIA). Earlier that day, Rosa Parks had been 
convicted of disorderly conduct for refusing to acquiesce to the Jim Crow laws 
of the segregated bus system. Her arrest and trial triggered plans for a one-day 
boycott of Montgomery buses. At the mass meeting celebrating the first day of 
the bus boycott, King asserted: “We are here because of our love for 
democracy, because of our deep-seated belief that democracy transformed from 
thin paper to thick action is the greatest form of government on earth.”120 
Drawing on the authority of the Supreme Court, he linked the decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education, which had come down a year earlier, to the 
authority of God, Jesus, and the very nature of justice itself. Declaring that he 
had “legal authority behind [him],” King linked his new community’s “right to 
protest for right” to a biblical story of divine justice.121 King challenged local 
legal authority with the national commands of the highest court. But he joined 
that challenge to the even higher authority of the religious faith that his 
listeners shared. 
The mass meetings were crucial. Like the one on December 5, 1955, at 
which King connected two important sources of justice, God and the Court, 
the meetings continued to play a critical role throughout the boycott’s thirteen 
months.122 For black Montgomery citizens, the mass protest action was a 
constant cycle of personal sacrifice, weariness, and collective “rousement” from 
 
120.  See supra note 63. 
121.  TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954–63, at 139-41 
(1988). 
122.  Women played an important part in the mobilization and in the material support that 
enabled the boycott to succeed. JoAnne Grant, for example, used her access to a 
mimeograph machine at the local college to produce flyers and handbills that helped 
publicize the initial mass meeting and had an important impact on turnout for the first day 
of the boycott. The existence of the handbills and flyers were evidence of organization and a 
message to the black people of Montgomery that they were not alone. 
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mass meetings.123 Mass meetings ultimately became the movement’s works of 
art. At those meetings, religious and legal idioms were fused and the collective 
will of the bus boys and the maids, the porters, and the seamstresses, was 
galvanized on a nightly basis.124 Middle class and poor blacks, at the local and 
national level, strategically mobilized their collective resources. As a result, fifty 
thousand black people in a single city refused to ride the segregated buses for 
more than a year.125 
At the time, black Montgomery attorney Fred Gray was bright, aggressive, 
and a year out of law school. Gray, who moonlighted on weekends as a 
preacher, wanted to challenge the city’s segregation laws even before Rosa 
Parks was arrested for refusing to obey them on a city bus. Yet Gray waited to 
file his case until the MIA leadership voted to grant him that authority. More 
significant than Gray’s apparent self-restraint126 were the institutional 
restraints imposed on him by the MIA, whose executive board and strategy 
committee rendered Gray unable to dominate their broader extra-legal 
strategies.127 For example, although they relied on stories of law and rights talk 
to both inspire and legitimize the boycott, King and the MIA initially resisted 
actually litigating (except for Parks’s catalytic appeal).128 Thus, Gray entered an 
organizing landscape with wide strategic possibilities that the MIA surveyed 
with Gray’s input, but not his control. Ultimately, the leadership authorized 
Gray to prepare the “ultimate weapon” of a federal lawsuit against bus 
 
123.  See BRANCH, supra note 121, at 145. 
124.  As Charles Payne noted, “Mixtures of the sacred and the profane, the mass meetings could 
be a very powerful social ritual . . . . [P]eople helped make new definitions of their 
individual and collective selves real.” PAYNE, supra note 24, at 263. Moreover, 
[m]ass meetings, which had the overall tone and structure of a church service, 
were grounded in the religious traditions and the esthetic sensibilities of the Black 
South. If the drudgery of canvassing accounted for much of an organizer’s time 
on a day-to-day basis, mass meetings, when they were good, were a part of the 
payoff, emotionally and politically . . . . 
Id. at 256. 
125.  See BRANCH, supra note 121, at 131-35. 
126.  Although Gray made clear his desire to directly challenge segregated busing with a federal 
suit, he did not press the issue further with the MIA; he began quietly exploring the option 
with NAACP lawyers in New York and with other attorneys in Alabama to be ready to 
deploy a lawsuit if necessary. See id. at 158. 
127.  See William Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469, 487 (1984). 
128.  See BRANCH, supra note 121, at 158-59. Once it became clear that the MIA’s relatively 
moderate negotiation strategy would not penetrate the obstinate city councilors, the MIA 
board discussed an alternative tactic of a black-owned bus line in addition to their “ultimate 
weapon” of a federal suit against bus segregation. Id. 
  
changing the wind 
2779 
 
segregation.129 Thanks to Gray’s advance behind-the-scenes preparation, he 
was able to file the suit relatively quickly.130 
Gray supported rather than led the boycott organized by the MIA, whose 
key resources grew out of grassroots mobilization and mass action.131 
Moreover, the deliberately non-bureaucratic structure of the MIA, an 
“organization of organizations,” extended to, and endured because of, the 
MIA’s grassroots fundraising.132 The MIA’s carpool and other capital-
dependent activities were initially supported by collections at the mass 
meetings,133 which literally “refueled” the boycott. Although money soon 
flowed from outside, these funds were raised in large part by black churches, 
organizations (including NAACP branches), and individuals, as well as some 
northern white individuals and organizations. Thus, money from sympathetic 
whites augmented the large sums systematically raised by the black community 
of Montgomery and its networks throughout the country.134 The funding pool 
spread with the fame of the MIA’s boycott: by the time the three-judge panel 
declared Jim Crow buses unconstitutional, the organization was rich enough to 
sustain the boycott pending the appeal.135 The upward, inward flow of financial 
resources located power inside the organization, not just its representatives. 
The MIA was a constituency of accountability, capable of holding lawyers 
like Gray to the discipline of shared power. With grassroots leadership 
anchored in the church, funding was not controlled by a single outside donor. 
Instead the MIA benefited from a motivated community and an ability to draw 
on the resources of the black middle class who initially provided the cars to 
ferry black people to their jobs. Although it was the intervention of the 
Supreme Court, ruling on the case Fred Gray brought in federal court, that 
ultimately declared the segregated buses unconstitutional, it was the social 
movement activism embedded in a biblical belief in justice that shortened the 
 
129.  See id. 
130.  See id. at 158, 163. 
131.  Gray moonlighted on weekends as a preacher in Montgomery. Despite Gray’s interest in 
NAACP-style impact litigation, he understood that he “represented” the MIA and not 
simply the named plaintiffs he recruited for a class action lawsuit. See id. 
132.  See BRANCH, supra note 121, at 144, 163, 176 (describing the relationship with NAACP); 
ALDON MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES 
ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 54 (1984). 
133.  See MORRIS, supra note 132, at 56. 
134.  Id. at 57. As a Brooklyn chapter NAACP leader wrote King: “Thousands of people, Negro 
and White, are working behind the lines to help you who are carrying on the fight on the 
front lines.” Id. at 57-58. 
135.  See BRANCH, supra note 121, at 188. 
  
the yale law journal 123:2740   2014  
2780 
 
distance between our democracy’s reality and its potential to be the “greatest 
form of government on earth.” Story-making by community members became 
mantras of the movement. One memorable mantra was Mother Pollard 
reassuring MLK that: “My feets is tired, but my soul is rested.”136 Told in their 
own words, these narratives of justice repositioned blacks in Montgomery from 
victims with a grievance to citizens with a cause. They captured the dignity of 
the community’s effort, inspired protests in other cities, built other insurgent 
organizations such as SCLC, and ultimately influenced blacks North and South 
to believe in their own agency to transform our democracy from “thin paper to 
thick action.” 
Fred Gray and other litigators certainly played a crucial role representing 
the boycotters in Montgomery.137 In this role, Gray and others were held 
accountable to a constituency that had rarely found a public voice. They 
translated their client’s concerns and grievances into legal cases that did much 
more than inform the litigants of their respective rights and responsibilities. 
The process in Montgomery transformed the nature of the political struggle 
using, among other things, the idiom of law.138 
As a result of the supportive and influential role of Fred Gray, and the 
community-driven power of the MIA, the boycott’s successes went beyond the 
litigation victory that decisively desegregated the buses.139 King personally 
noted the lessons learned: the solidarity of the community around a common 
cause;140 the integrity of their leaders, who did not have to sell out; the 
increasing militancy of the black church; and the community’s discoveries of 
dignity, destiny, and strategy.141 Furthermore, the movement trained King and 
other fellow ministers as leaders in the civil rights struggle; although the MIA 
 
136.  See BRANCH, supra note 121, at 164 (recounting Mother Pollard’s public reassurance to King 
that he was not alone). 
137.  See FRED GRAY, BUS RIDE TO JUSTICE: CHANGING THE SYSTEM BY THE SYSTEM (1994). 
138.  See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989). Of course, according to some observers, 
legal victories by these outsiders can spark political backlash even as they inspire and 
energize popular mobilization. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 14; see also BROWN-NAGIN, 
supra note 34 (discussing the 1960s student sit-ins in Atlanta). 
139.  Robert Jerome Glennon, The Role of Law in the Civil Rights Movement: The Montgomery Bus 
Boycott, 1955-1957, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 59, 94-97 (1991). 
140.  Cf. SIDNEY TARROW, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS 
POLITICS 4 (1998) (describing social movements as (1) collective challenges, based on (2) 
common purposes and (3) social solidarity in (4) sustained interaction with elites, 
opponents, and authorities). 
141.  BRANCH, supra note 121, at 195. 
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itself burnt out after the sustained boycott campaign, from its ashes rose a new 
organization, the SCLC.142 
The court decisions in Browder v. Gayle143 were important texts that 
influenced and conditioned discourse and action within the larger society. But 
legal academics and lawyers often ignore the complex and extrajudicial ways in 
which social movement actors make themselves audible to each other, to their 
opponents, and to elite policy makers and legal interpreters. The popular 
amnesia relating to the case of Browder demonstrates the ways in which law, 
while important to the legal affirmation of the premise of the boycott, has been 
viewed almost as a footnote to the action of the boycotters and the sustained 
resistance that it represented. The litigation, the judicial decision, and the 
actions of the people combined to change the climate in Montgomery. They 
changed the wind. 
As the Montgomery Bus Boycott story illustrates, the actual conversation 
between law and social movement activism is complex and multi-directional. It 
is grounded in the actions and beliefs of ordinary people who come together 
and craft, through their experiences and actions, a story of social life and power 
and make change over time. It draws in participants from outside the 
profession, deepening law’s reach beyond the sophisticated legal grammar of 
formal fairness to the transcendent commitments of justice. When this 
happens, the language of law is stretched to accommodate the language of the 
people, especially those who act collectively to strengthen our democracy. 
Thus, social movement actors in Montgomery influenced the way courts and 
the people themselves interpreted and gave meaning to law. 
The bus boycott involved a theory of popular mobilization and a theory of 
representative democracy. Social movement activists, represented by lawyers 
but also representing themselves, became important authoritative 
interpretative communities of our democracy. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 
authoritative interpretive community was grounded in a “democratic” universe 
of people who were “voting” with their feet (by walking to work), with their 
personal spirit fused with the spirit of collective struggle and the historic story 
of biblical liberation, and with the meaningfulness of their shared sacrifice. 
Their actions had lasting impact to the extent they provoked shifts in popular 
understandings of law and justice. They did not just enforce specific and 
discrete law reform policies or proposals. By interrogating their collective 
discourse in the same ways lawyers and scholars carefully analyze Supreme 
 
142.  Glennon, supra note 139, at 96-97. 
143.  352 U.S. 903 (1956). 
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Court oral arguments and the resulting decisions, we can begin to understand 
the way social movement actors author legal meaning.144 
In the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the lawyers represented a movement, not 
a class. The iconic images of the bus boycott are fifty thousand black people 
mobilized for over a year to collectively protest the arrest of Rosa Parks and the 
continued segregation of the municipal buses. The Montgomery Improvement 
Association had weekly leadership meetings with the lawyers to plot out a joint 
strategy of protest and resistance. The forum for change was not the courtroom 
or the law office conference room, but the mass meeting. Even the discussion 
of what was at stake had to undergo community interrogation. The 
Montgomery Bus Boycott and the MIA demanded equal dignity and relief 
from the oppressive private enforcement of white racial privilege. That demand 
resulted in the desegregation of the buses, but the court decision in many ways 
ratified the actions of the people. Desegregation meant the freedom to sit 
anywhere they wanted and it de-deputized the drivers from acting as civilian 
enforcers for the political elite. 
The mass mobilization created a shared purpose and was symbolized by the 
middle class black community committing its private automobiles to the 
creation of an alternative public transportation system. Given the importance 
of cars to the status of their owners, this represented a serious commitment. 
This was vital to the cross-class integrity of the protest that led to its success 
and power. It could not have lasted as long as it did without this crucial 
contribution. Another example of how the mobilization produced the capacity 
for resistance is found in the alternative media system created by the MIA and 
its supporters that could keep the conventional media honest. The community 
was able to leverage its resources that would individually be relatively meager 
but in combination provided the critical capacity to resist.145  
 
144.  The very nature of legal education makes it hard to gain this perspective in law school. The 
technique of inquiry in law schools involves the close examination of individual opinions 
written by appellate judges about individual disputes, where the only facts that matter are 
those deemed legally relevant to the result the court reaches. The raw material of the 
appellate opinion is a very selective statement of the actual events that motivated the dispute 
that resulted in a lawsuit. It is as though the social facts are stripped away so that the merest 
silhouette of reality becomes its definition for the purposes of “law.” 
145.  Neither King nor Rosa Parks alone desegregated the buses. The success of the boycott 
depended on the ability of leaders like King and the network of community activists to 
maintain an alternative source of popular information, which permitted him and the MIA to 
quickly counter the false claims that were about to be published in the Sunday edition of the 
Montgomery Advertiser that the boycott was over. The leaders of the boycott fanned out to 
the black clubs, churches, house parties, and other places black people might be gathering 
on a Saturday night to bring them the truth about the boycott. 
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While there continues to be a healthy debate over the significance of the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott and whether it would have succeeded without the 
correlative court victories and a Supreme Court ready to integrate public 
conveyances, it seems to us that there were at least two independently 
important results of the local, regional, and national coverage of the events in 
Montgomery. First, it validated a new model of protest and created a place 
where what black people knew to be the truth could be validated without the 
mediation of institutions that were controlled by others. This is not to say that 
without the protests there would not have been disputes over the existence of 
invidious discrimination, but the meaning of the racialized institutions from 
the perspectives of black people was given a central place. The concrete 
meaning of inequality could be exposed in the disparate distribution of both 
public and private wealth. Also, the minor indignities and multitudinous 
microaggressions could be understood as part of the system of white racial 
supremacy. This may have had an effect on local federal judges that 
encouraged or enabled them to act more quickly to do justice despite the wrath 
of their peers: keep it in the courts and not on the streets. Second, it mobilized 
a local black community—tempered through the months of struggle—that was 
able to pressure the city into complying with the Supreme Court’s order 
because noncompliance put too much at risk for the city. 
Of longer term significance was the formation of new organizations, both 
the MIA and the SCLC. These organizations helped institutionalize the idea of 
mass mobilization and hastened the transformation of the church by centering 
it on the social gospel and locating its claims in politics and morality. The 
success helped launch a national movement and created a new cadre of young 
leadership. Equally important is that it gave agency and dignity to 
participants.146 It validated their experience in a way that others had to credit. 
The national publicity educated whites and others outside of the South, and in 
this way would help transform the national debate about race. 
i i i .  the story of the united farmworkers:  another view of 
the struggle for freedom 
The first two stories recounted dramatic moments in the history of the 
struggle for black civil equality. The stories were tied to long struggles 
 
146.  Cf. GORDON, supra note 60 (describing a process by which undocumented workers came to 
her legal clinic full of outrage because of dignitary harms suffered for which there was no 
legal remedy, and how, nevertheless, resolving the things that the law could control gave 
them a sense of agency and dignity—a path out of the morass—even if it did not directly 
address their outrage). 
  
the yale law journal 123:2740   2014  
2784 
 
beginning with the First Reconstruction and even before. The Second 
Reconstruction resulted in canonical statutes and court decisions and a basic 
restructuring of the relationship between the federal government, the 
individual, and the state. But it was more than that. It was the mobilization of 
an engaged citizenry that confronted racialized injustice, named it, and created 
the informal institutions to consolidate and identify resources that would make 
sustained resistance possible. “Freedom Summer” brought many northerners 
to the South to participate in the transformation of the United States. One of 
these young northerners was Marshall Ganz, a sophomore at Harvard who 
dropped out to work in Mississippi. He left Harvard in 1962 and spent more 
than two years there working with organizers in the black community, 
organizing voters, and helping to create alternative sources of power for the 
people who had been denied access to the formal institutions of governance. 
A native of California, the son of a rabbi in Bakersfield, Marshall went 
home and in the process realized that his work in Mississippi had changed him. 
The brown people sweating in feudal conditions in the fruit and vegetable 
fields of central California were no longer just part of the background against 
which his life was lived. Instead, he explained, he saw the brutal conditions in 
the fields through what he called “Mississippi eyes.” Those eyes let him see 
that the sharecropping that defined rural poverty and oppression in the south 
had a western expression in the labor gangs in California’s Central Valley. The 
structure of disenfranchisement differed in detail, but not in effect. Like the 
black people in the South, the field workers were just resources to be used, not 
people to be respected. 
Efforts to organize migrant farm workers had long been viewed as futile. 
Many were undocumented and even those who were citizens were poor and 
often illiterate in English and even in Spanish. Nonetheless, the precursor to 
what would become the United Farm Workers began the task of organizing 
workers farm by farm, field by field. Marshall did not go back to Mississippi. 
There was work to be done in California. 
While the work would mirror the efforts for civic, political, and economic 
justice that were taking place in the South, one of the prime movers in 
California was the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA). The NFWA 
would later become the more famous United Farm Workers. While many 
histories of this movement focus on its role as a labor organization dominated 
by and working on behalf of the interests of Mexican Americans, Ganz showed 
how this struggle was connected to the broader movement for justice. In 1966, 
during the march from the farm town of Delano to the state capitol, 
Sacramento, a reporter for an African American newspaper simply stated: 
  
changing the wind 
2785 
 
“Those who march for Negro Freedom also have to march for freedom of other 
men, for economic freedom and justice.”147 
The NFWA laid the groundwork for a broader movement by defining itself 
not just as a labor organization, but as a “farm worker civil rights movement.” 
It recognized the necessity to develop public support beyond local labor 
markets. This support was possible because, as Ganz pointed out, 
the core leadership and volunteers participated in the day-to-day, 
tactical decision making involved in each strike, the newcomers learned 
how to function as part of a leadership team, while the top leaders 
learned first-hand about the on-the-ground realities about which they 
had to strategize. . . . The NFWA’s capacity for continuous learning, its 
motivation to learn, and its access to an array of ever-changing but 
relevant information set it apart.148 
It was through the struggle for farm worker rights to organize and live with 
dignity that many other elements of the Chicano movement (La Causa) came 
together and formed alliances with leadership in the black community. If there 
was going to be a movement for justice in the American West, it would 
necessarily be multicultural given the demographics of the West. In fact, 
because of its public leadership, the UFW is commonly thought of as a 
Mexican American organization. Despite that public perception, however, the 
membership and the governing councils of the union reflected the diversity of 
the state. The history of the UFW could not be written without a reference to 
the Filipino workers and the white and Jewish organizers who worked 
shoulder-to-shoulder with Cesar Chavez, Dolores Huerta, and the other better-
known members of the union. Moreover, the UFW and La Causa more 
generally used elements of cultural struggle to popularize their positions and to 
empower the rank and file in ways that generated a kind of participatory 
democracy. 
Before exploring the cross-racial alliances that gave foundational support to 
the union in its efforts to organize the workers and to organize the politicians 
necessary to achieve a change in the farm labor laws, we want to focus on an 
innovation of the UFW that gave the workers themselves the power to engage 
in full-throated exploration of the politics of economic justice. By reviving the 
form of the Actos, Luis Valdez and his allies created a mechanism that 
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politicized aesthetics in a way that made drama a useful tool for education, 
mobilization, and change.149 
A. The Formation and Impact of El Teatro Campesino 
Teatro Campesino started when Luis Valdez travelled to his hometown, 
Delano, California, to participate in a march in support of the Grape Pickers 
strike organized by the newly formed United Farm Workers Organizing 
Committee (UFWOC).150 The year was 1965 and it was no coincidence that the 
rise of the UFWOC and Teatro Campesino came at a time of great 
sociopolitical action motivated by the social unrest present amongst blacks and 
Chicanos who were leading a multi-dimensional civil rights movement.151 
Valdez, who had apprenticed with the San Francisco Mime Troupe, 
approached UFWOC leaders Cesar Chavez and Dolores Huerta about starting 
a farmworker theater company. Chavez explained that there was not money, 
actors, or a stage for a theater company.152 Yet, he told Valdez that if he could 
put something together, it was fine with him.153 “And that was all we needed—
a chance,” explained Valdez.154 Valdez was committed to the idea of creating a 
theater “of, by, and for farmworkers” and gave birth to Teatro Campesino on 
the picket lines of Delano.155 According to Valdez, the picket line was the only 
and most effective place to do what he wanted to do: “communicate with the 
workers non-violently and . . . communicate ideas with humor, a lot of energy, 
and a lot of spirit.”156 Valdez described the moment in which Teatro 
Campesino was formed: 
I talked for about ten minutes, and then realized that talking wasn’t 
going to accomplish anything. The thing to do was do it, so I called 
three of them over, and on two hung Huelgista signs. Then I gave one 
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an Esquirol sign, and told him to stand up there and act like an 
Esquirol—a scab. He didn’t want to at first, because it was a dirty word 
at that time, but he did it in good spirits. Then the two huelgistas started 
shouting at him, and everybody started cracking up. All of a sudden, 
people started coming into the pink house from I don’t know where; 
they filled up the whole kitchen. We started changing signs around and 
people started volunteering, “Let me play so and so,” “Look this is what 
I did,” imitating all kinds of things. We ran for about two hours just 
doing that. By the time we had finished, there were people packing the 
place. They were in the doorways, the living room, and they were 
outside at the windows peeking in. Dolores [Huerta] showed up later. 
She stood there watching, and I think it got the message across—that 
you can do a lot by acting out things.157  
Later on, the troupe performed in front of the farmworkers for the first 
time. “We jumped on top of a truck and started performing. Then something 
great happened. Our work raised the spirits of everybody on the picket line and 
Cesar saw that,” said Valdez.158 Soon, Teatro Campesino became “the cultural 
voice of the UFWOC.”159 Yolanda Broyles-González posits that “[t]he Teatro 
Campesino’s militance was a direct response to the needs of the UFW struggle 
from which it emerged.”160 That included a “need to unionize in the struggle 
against the multiple abuses of agribusiness, which included large-scale 
pesticide poisoning of farm laborers, exploitative wages, substandard housing, 
child labor, and no benefits.”161 In effect, Teatro Campesino formed an 
authoritative interpretative sub-community within the UFWOC that 
profoundly impacted the way the movement as a whole perceived the law and 
justice. It served as the “bridge” between the farmworkers’ “lived experience” 
and “imagined alternative.”162 Teatro Campesino transformed how 
farmworkers thought of their own power to make change and motivated them 
to take action in reclaiming the rights the theater convinced them they 
deserved. It also defined the lived experience of the farmworkers, an experience 
to which the UFWOC lawyers were being held accountable. 
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Luis Valdez describes Teatro Campesino as “somewhere between Brecht 
and Cantinflas.”163 Cantinflas “is virtually synonymous with a Mexican popular 
tradition of comedy associated in the past two hundred years with the carpa,” a 
“tent show” which has served as a “counterhegemonic tool of the 
disenfranchised and oppressed.”164 The actos, or skits, were improvised. Valdez 
described the process of creating an acto: “We take a real situation—often 
something that happens on the picket line—and we improvise around it. When 
we get an improvisation that we like, we’re ready. An acto is never written 
down.”165 Essentially, each acto represented a story about individual and social 
fairness and justice. “Memory indeed was the prime conduit for all 
performance work within Teatro Campesino,” explains Broyles-González.166 
“And the power and instrumentality of memory, rooted in the community and 
in the body, made possible the immediacy, authenticity, and vitality 
characteristic of the ensemble’s work.”167 The use of humor also played an 
important role, as Valdez explains: 
We use comedy because it stems from a necessary situation—the 
necessity of lifting the morale of our strikers, who have been on strike 
for seventeen months. When they go to a meeting it’s long and drawn 
out; so we do comedy, with the intention of making them laugh—but 
with a purpose. We try to make social points, not in spite of the 
comedy, but through it. This leads us into satire and slap-stick, and 
sometimes very close to the underlying tragedy of it all—the fact that 
human beings have been wasted in farm labor for generations. . . . 
. . . People say, “Yes, that’s the way it is,” and they laugh. If it’s a 
reality they recognize as their own, they’ll laugh and perhaps tears will 
come to their eyes.168  
Chavez had long wanted to use the carpa as an organizing tool, believing 
that it could provide farmworkers with a shared cultural language.169 “With a 
carpa, we could say difficult things to people without offending them,” 
explained Chavez. “We could talk about people being cowards, for example. 
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Instead of being offensive, it would be funny. Yet it could communicate union 
issues.”170 Teatro Campesino itself was a “unique and often effective social and 
cultural weapon” that was used when regular union organizers failed.171 For 
example, in Selma, California, Teatro Campesino succeeded in convincing 
farmworkers of the need to organize after UFWOC organizers had tried for 
weeks without any success.172 The effectiveness of Teatro Campesino may stem 
from the fact that its actos represented a declaration of rights that was asserted 
through the exhibition of a shared lived experience coupled with a remedy. 
“One of the things we’re forced to do in our form of drama is present the 
solution. The farm workers say, ‘We know the problems, what about it?’ So in 
the acto, a farm worker grabs the Huelga sign and shouts, ‘Huelga!,’” explains 
Valdez.173 “[I]t forces us to think up endings that are basically the same. It’s the 
snap ending; you end with a bang, and certainly with hope. You show some 
kind of victory, even though victory is not immediately forthcoming.”174 
Teatro Campesino was part of a “widespread theatrical mobilization” that 
“sought to affirm an alternative social vision that relied on a distinctly 
Chicana/o aesthetic.”175 In effect, it helped create and champion a new moral 
vision both within the movement and beyond. The Wall Street Journal 
described Teatro Campesino as a “proletarian pantomime.”176 “Chicano 
intellectuals even touted [it] as ‘a key to a new historical consciousness.’”177 
Most importantly, the farmworkers began to “see themselves as the 
protagonists in a daily drama that had seemed theirs alone until this moment,” 
explains Jorge A. Huerta.178 “With each improvisation of their daily struggles, 
these campesinos demonstrate to Valdez that there is a message to be 
dramatized and that the talent to dramatize it is in this room.”179 During the 
day, the Teatro Campesino troupe would “visit campuses and Latino 
neighborhoods to build support for the union and would also perform on a 
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flatbed truck in the fields adjacent to picketing workers.”180 Later, at night, it 
performed on makeshift stages right in the middle of the fields “before 
laughing and boisterous crowds, who watched performances illuminated by car 
headlights.”181 
The early actos all revolved around one solution: “join the union.”182 The 
theater troupe did not specifically focus on tangibly changing the legal reality 
of the farmworkers. Rather, it was part of a broader mobilization effort not 
only to change the way justice was administrated, but also to alter the way 
farmworkers viewed themselves and their own power within the system. “Our 
most important aim is to reach the farmworker. All the actors are farmworkers, 
and our single topic is the Huelga,” Valdez stated.183 Valdez further describes 
the purpose of Teatro Campesino: 
We don’t think in terms of art, but of our political purpose in putting 
across certain points. We think of our spiritual purpose in terms of 
turning on crowds. We know when we’re not turning on the crowd. 
From a show business point of view that’s bad enough, but when 
you’re trying to excite crowds to go out on strike or to support you, it 
gains an added significance.184 
“Valdez’s company made no pretense of creating Great Art. Nor did it have 
time for such aesthetic dreams when members of the group could be called 
away at any moment to walk the picket lines or hand out leaflets in a field or 
get involved in any of the activities the fledgling union demanded.”185 Instead, 
Valdez identified five goals he hoped to accomplish with the actos: (1) “Inspire 
the audience to social action,” (2) “Illuminate specific points about social 
problems,” (3) “Satirize the opposition,” (4) “Show or hint at a solution,” and 
(5) “Express what people are thinking.”186 Ultimately, the “simple recreations” 
of the farmworkers’ plight did not just have a democracy enhancing effect; it 
also helped the workers find a “spirit of reinforcement and encouragement.”187 
 
180.  Shaw, supra note 176, at 278. 
181.  Id. 
182.  HUERTA, supra note 178, at 16. 
183.  ELAM, supra note 150, at 100. 
184.  Bagby, supra note 157, at 78. 
185.  HUERTA, supra note 178, at 16. 
186.  Id. 
187.  Id. at 13. 
  
changing the wind 
2791 
 
The special attributes of the acto helped Valdez accomplish his goals. The 
acto requires at least two characters and a conflict.188 As long as the conflict is 
commonly understood and solved by the acto’s participants, the essential 
elements of the acto are present.189 Teatro Campesino member Olivia 
Chumacero explained: 
You had to draw from yourself, from where you were coming from. 
Things came out from you, from what you thought, from where you 
were coming from, from what you had experienced in life. . . . It was 
not a mechanical learning of lines, word for word. Words that someone 
had put in your mouth. It was your life.190 
The actos also involved audience participation.191 The actors “transformed 
spectators into active participants, and their participatory activity inside the 
theater was an indicator of or precursor to revolutionary activity outside of the 
theater.”192 Luis Valdez declared in 1967, “We shouldn’t be judged as a theater. 
We’re really part of a cause.”193 
Teatro Campesino also had a profound effect beyond the farmworker 
community. Soon after its creation, the troupe was invited by Stanford 
University for a paid performance.194 “We performed in a student lounge, and 
there were about fifty people present. It was interesting from the viewpoint 
that what we had been doing for farm workers in Delano could work outside 
too, in a university setting,” explained Valdez.195 It was a success and from 
there on out, Teatro Campesino began to tour campuses, churches, community 
halls, and theaters.196 The farmworkers’ message was taken from the field to 
the cities, where audiences were moved to donate money to a union that 
desperately needed all of the financial support that it could get.197 
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B. Las Dos Caras del Patroncito (The Two Faces of the Boss) 
Jorge H. Huerta describes the acto, Las Dos Caras del Patroncito, as being 
“representative of the needs [of the UFWOC] at the time.”198 The first 
performance of the acto was in 1965 on the picket lines of the Delano grape 
strike.199 The acto was created to combat the power and wealth of the growers 
that made organizing and striking so difficult for the UFWOC.200 In response, 
Valdez and the actors created an acto where the farmworker and the boss (el 
patroncito) exchange roles so that each figure understands what it is like to be in 
the shoes of the other.201 The patroncito is identified by a pig-face mask and the 
farmworker by his shears.202 The patroncito, who is tired of the “frustrations” 
associated with wealth, agrees to trade places with the farmworker.203 He then 
sheds his symbols of oppression: his mask, whip, cigar, and coat.204 Upon 
removing these items, the farmworker exclaims, “Patron, you look like me!,”205 
suggesting that the patroncito’s “power was not essential nor internal within the 
body but, instead, constructed.”206 The farmworker puts on the pig-face mask 
and becomes the patroncito.207 He begins to list the things belonging to him 
and offers the former patroncito less pay.208 The patroncito turned farmworker 
realizes that things have gone too far and calls for help.209 However, the police 
officer on stage does not recognize the patroncito without his symbols of power 
and takes him away.210 The patroncito shouts, “Where’s those damn union 
organizers? Where’s Cesar Chavez? Help! Huelga!”211 The debasement of the 
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patroncito is described as “an important turning point in the assertion of 
[farmworkers’] dignity.”212 
Harry Elam writes, “[t]his acto affirmed the new awareness of self-worth 
and cultural pride among . . . the underdogs . . . . [It] exposed the vulnerability 
of the ranch owner and encouraged farmworkers to arise as new political 
subjects in their own real struggle against subordination.”213 The context in 
which Las Dos Caras was originally performed, in front of the grower’s armed 
security guards, augmented its effects. The performance itself was “an act of 
resistance” that “was at once within and outside the other strike activities on 
the picket line.”214 In effect, it “worked to redress the present social drama by 
symbolically disempowering the ranchers and revealing the potential power 
achieved through collective farmworker participation in the strike.”215 
“Through the power of performance El Teatro contested conventional power 
relationships and the subordination of farmworkers within the agribusiness 
hierarchy,” writes Elam.216 
Las Dos Caras also reconceptualized the social order in which the 
farmworkers lived. The audience participation together with the context in 
which the acto was performed in the fields where the story originated gave 
farmworkers a sense of agency. Power was portrayed as external and 
constructed, rather than internal. One academic argues that the role reversal in 
Las Dos Caras represents the transfer of external social trappings that determine 
social status and in effect “can topple the entire social order.”217 Elam, on the 
other hand, believes that the social order was inverted as the hierarchy remained 
in place in order to symbolize the power deflation that the UFWOC was 
attempting to effect in actuality.218 “This acto affirmed the new awareness of 
self-worth and cultural pride among” the underdogs, writes Elam.219 “[It] 
exposed the vulnerability of the ranch owner and encouraged farmworkers to 
arise as new political subjects in their own real struggle against 
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subordination.”220 Both theories encompass the view that the acto reinterpreted 
the status quo and offered an alternative vision of power. 
By the late 1960s, El Teatro Campesino was no longer singularly concerned 
with farmworkers and farmworker organizing and expanded to broader issues 
of “Chicano identity, racism in education, the Vietnam War, and police 
brutality.”221 “But always,” Valdez notes, “the cultural root is the campesino, the 
farmworker. I don’t care how sophisticated we get in the city, we share the 
communal remembrance of the earth. This goes for Chicanos as well as anyone 
else.”222 
C. The Organizing Effort: Labor and Civil Rights 
Like the civil rights activists in the South, the UFW leadership knew that 
strategy matters. 
When Cesar Chavez used to say “power makes you stupid,” this is what 
he meant: you come to rely on an overwhelming resource advantage, 
which is exactly what creates opportunity for the Davids of the world. 
Chavez took particular pleasure in getting people together to figure 
things out, to respond to moves with countermoves, to find ways, as he 
would say, to kill two birds with one stone and keep the stone. 223  
Built on a foundation of commitment to the cause rather than to a particular 
strategy, the union was able to improvise and learn from the people on the 
ground. You also “need access to the right kind of information . . . [T]he UFW 
wove together its connections with the farm worker world, the churches, the 
unions, the civil rights movement, and the political domain in widely diverse 
ways.”224 In addition, the UFW was willing to learn and it had “the courage to 
risk failure.”225 
The UFW was more than a union, but it was, of course, created to organize 
farm workers and to secure contracts on their behalf. In the process of 
negotiating more than a hundred union contracts and having in excess of fifty 
thousand dues-paying members, the union trained hundreds of organizers and 
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community activists. These efforts enabled the UFW to become a player in 
California politics as well as a major player in Chicano activism unrelated to 
farmworker issues. Because of the use of the boycott and the involvement of 
non-labor activists and celebrities, the public responded to the actions and 
issues raised by the UFW as part of the civil rights movement rather than as a 
standard labor conflict. After more than a dozen years of activism and 
sometimes violent conflict in the fields, the union and its antagonists were able 
to negotiate the passage of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (ALRA) and to 
inaugurate a new era of agricultural labor relations.226 
The ALRA was designed by the UFW not just to be a framework for 
securing new contracts, but to use the process of collective bargaining to 
continue to organize.227 The provisions of the Act permitted swift elections and 
created a process that would help guard against intimidation by the growers. In 
addition, the anti-intimidation provisions also promoted worker education. 
The UFW wanted to use the ALRA to promote continued organization of 
farmworkers.228 
Yet, despite the success of the organizing during the 1960s, the most 
dangerous period for the UFW came after the ALRA was passed. The truth is 
that “the living and working conditions of California farm workers are little 
better at the beginning of the twenty-first century” than when the organizing 
efforts began.229 “Although the [ALRA] remains the only collective bargaining 
law to encourage farm worker unionization in the continental United States, 
the organization that made it work is a shadow of its former self.”230 As 
Marshall Ganz noted:  
Once again, however, a moment of victory became a moment of danger. 
. . . This time, however, the threat came from within and it was not 
overcome. Within just four years [of the passage of ALRA], the UFW 
stopped organizing, drove out most of its experienced leaders, and 
entered into a decline from which it has not recovered.231 
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conclusion: democracy at its best is  a social movement 
The point of the stories we have told, which are only exemplary, is that the 
courts alone are not the voice of change. At best, the courts ratify change. The 
social movement activists—through their political mobilization and their 
transformation of the culture—made the actions of the Supreme Court seem 
appropriate and long overdue. 
In the case of both the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party and the 
Montgomery Bus Boycott, black activists did not just want a chance to compete 
for a seat at a convention or on a bus. To allow two individuals to represent the 
whole, as Joseph Rauh and Martin Luther King, Jr. did in the MFDP conflict, 
takes the power away from the community they claim to represent. In 
Montgomery, the MIA did not want just more seats, or even the mere 
desegregation of the buses; they wanted to eliminate the private enforcement 
of Jim Crow laws by the bus drivers. Thus activists in both Mississippi and 
Montgomery claimed an alternative source of power, one that took the promise 
of democracy seriously. They restructured the meaning of opportunity at the 
same time that they restructured the meaning of representation. 
Nevertheless, the civil rights movement, especially at the national level, was 
not a fight in which all blacks were represented. Many middle class blacks (just 
like their white counterparts) used the language of qualifications (speaking 
proper English, knowing how to read and write) to define who the leaders 
should be and to privilege some spokespersons over others. The idiom of 
“qualifications” meant an unlettered sharecropper should not dominate the 
national drama of the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City. The 
MFDP’s stance, therefore, sought to push black and white elites to face up to 
the double exclusion of poor blacks “from mainstream and movement 
politics.”232 By directly confronting the language of qualifications and all that it 
entailed, local activists also thought they had found a way to talk about class 
without reducing race to class or the reverse.233 
Indeed, the MFDP’s demands challenged the lack of democracy in 
Mississippi as well as in the National Democratic Party. These mainly poor and 
illiterate black activists threatened the monopoly on power held by national 
elites, not just white segregationists. They soon learned that few traditional 
black leaders would be persistent in the face of white resistance, whether at the 
local or national level. The danger posed by common people speaking on their 
own behalf had been enough to trigger an outburst by Roy Wilkins, the head 
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of the national NAACP. Wilkins excoriated Hamer, “[Y]ou people are 
ignorant, you don’t know anything about politics, you put your point over, 
why don’t you pack up and return to Miss.?”234 
Like Roy Wilkins, legal advocates and cause lawyers also often lose 
perspective when they move to study and learn from the places where lawyers 
are most in control during these public conflicts.235 The conflict may be 
translated into the legal documents they study, but they often forget that it is a 
translation for a specialized audience using a rarefied way of talking about and 
understanding the world. It is not that the legal elites are wrong; it is just that 
their representation is only a partial view of the cathedral. They zoom in on the 
brief Rauh wrote, for example, citing the relevant statutes, organizational rules, 
and court decisions. They may even parse the legal documents and subsequent 
case law in search of the conflict’s enduring meaning. For these inquisitors, 
what matters over time is the way elite actors ultimately give meaning to the 
actions of non-elite activists. We are arguing that the reverse is often closer to 
the truth. The elite actors often derive the social meaning of their actions from 
the efforts of non-elite activists like Fanny Lou Hamer and all of the others 
standing behind and beside her. 
The boycotters in Montgomery and the activists of the MFDP moved from 
marginal characters to members of authoritative interpretative communities. 
What they were reinterpreting was the meaning of American constitutional 
justice. They ultimately restructured the politics of the possible. They gave 
their actions a plausible explanation, one that formed the basis for shared 
understanding. That understanding initially grew from an internal explanation 
that allowed a sense of community to exist. But it ultimately had to persuade 
 
234.  Id. at 395. 
235.  For a definition of cause lawyers as political actors whose work involves doing law, who use 
their legal skills to pursue ends and ideals that transcend client service, and who are involved 
in a professional project to provide a public good, but who are also not the same as public 
interest lawyers, see STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: 
POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING 1-22 (2004). Scheingold & Sarat argue 
that the cause lawyer fits within the legal profession’s mainstream discourse of lawyering as 
a public good. They attempt to justify the cause lawyer’s role in a democracy, by 
distinguishing between political and rule-of-law cause lawyers.  
[Political] cause lawyers, in effect, declare their solidarity with their clients and 
the causes they jointly pursue. . . . Conversely, rule-of-law cause lawyers tend to 
identify with rights, legality, and constitutionality as ends in themselves. For the 
politically engaged cause lawyer, both the client and the law are treated as means 
rather than ends. For the legally engaged cause lawyer, legality is, in effect, the 
cause.  
  Id. at 18. We use the term cause lawyer to refer both to political and rule of law lawyers. 
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external actors, as well. These two communities became authoritative because 
other members of the polity found themselves having to come to terms with 
their interpretations. In a heroic version of the actions of the Montgomery 
boycotters and the MFDP activists, they demonstrated that institutional 
change was necessary in order to validate the rhetoric of democracy and 
equality. These two movements illustrate what Professor Thomas Stoddard 
documented: rule shifting without culture shifting is not enough to produce 
real and sustained change.236 
While the black people in Montgomery and the MFDP activists wanted 
seats, the metaphor should not be lost. Their stories are “texts” in what we 
have come to call demosprudence. Defying the rules for seating on a bus or at a 
national political convention both implicated and challenged the private use of 
state power. The Mississippi and Alabama activists were not, however, merely 
confronting the authority of the state. They were also confronting the claims of 
what constituted justice. They removed the mantle of authority from what 
claimed to be authoritative but which was shown to be false. They challenged 
the “is” with a vision of the “ought” and pushed the larger society to 
contemplate “what might be” if justice would be made real. Most importantly, 
they helped shift the cultural norms, not just the rules. They enacted a 
“normative” or “motivating” vision of a just society that was both remedial and 
aspirational. It was through their actions that dramatic interventions in the 
status quo were enacted rather than merely contemplated. 
To the extent that the UFWOC succeeded, it was in large part because of 
its ability to draw on cultural heuristics and transcendent questions of justice. 
In addition, the dogged and relentless organizing of the UFW joined more 
than just labor grievances with broader questions of social justice. Its strategic 
mobilization of resources permitted the UFW to prevail, while better-funded 
rivals failed. Without this capacity to mobilize unrecognized resources there 
would have been no ALRA. The UFW linked Catholic conceptions of justice to 
their claims against the growers. The use of the iconography of religion was 
similar to Dr. King’s ability to ground his claims for justice using the belief 
structure of the Baptist Church. 
 
236.  See Stoddard, supra note 10. We are particularly interested in mobilizations (or collective 
action) that share three elements: (1) they are premised on a set of beliefs about the future, 
or how things might be (based on a normative vision), (2) their stories of the future contain 
the motivation for acting, and (3) their actions express the moral of the story. Our interest 
includes collective mobilizations, from the right as well as from the left, that share in 
common an abiding commitment to mass mobilization over time to transform culture, 
economic or social arrangements, and/or institutions. Electoral campaigns, litigation to yield 
a singular judicial victory, and legislative strategies may be tactics deployed by a social 
movement, but they alone do not signal the existence of a social movement. 
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We agree with Professor Ackerman that the courts, the legislature, and the 
electoral process are important. However, Ackerman’s focus on the elite should 
not blind us to the actions of ordinary men and women on the ground. 
Without the people who were mobilized across the South and North (the 
participants in Freedom Summer, for example), there would have been few 
effective leaders. It was their concerted actions that gave substantive content to, 
and amplified the voices of, the so-called “spokesmen for the American 
people.” Without the MFDP, without SNCC, without the march from Selma 
to Montgomery, there would have been no Voting Rights Act in 1965; there 
would have been no fundamental change in the understanding of what our 
democracy is for. Similarly, without the UFW—and its capacity to organize 
allies across the country (beginning with the march from Delano to 
Sacramento)—there would have been no Agricultural Labor Relations Act 
(ALRA) in California. 
The leaders of political institutions get their courage to act from the people 
themselves. President Johnson could never have delivered his “We Shall 
Overcome” speech, as important and dramatic as it was, without the sacrifices 
of the people in the civil rights movement. The importance of that formulation 
is as much in the idea of a “movement” as it is in the content of “civil rights.” 
The substantive content changed as the democratic potential in our culture as a 
whole was enlarged and the possibility of achieving the promise of the four 
freedoms of the original new deal seemed accessible for all. 
In many ways, our project is not new. Like Professor Ackerman, we are 
challenging the privileging of formal sources of authority that discount or 
minimize the role of social movement activists and other contentious forms of 
organized power to name their own reality and give that reality a heart, a soul, 
and a story. The political transformation of the United States comes not just 
from what the Court is doing or what arguments the lawyers for the social 
movements are making. The movement activists themselves are part of the law 
creation process. They make some arguments more resonant and even more 
plausible. This is what Adam Liptak, in describing the dueling roles played by 
iconic Supreme Court cases like Brown v. Board of Education, calls the “music” 
as opposed to the “logic” of law.237 Lawyers are usually understood to control 
the logic of law through their analysis of precedent and commitment to 
principle. Meanwhile, the activists reveal the music of law by combining legal 
rights talk with home-grown stories of justice that define normative or 
narrative frames through which to understand what the courts thought they 
 
237.  Adam Liptak, Brown v. Board of Education, Second Round, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/10/weekinreview/10liptak.html. 
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were doing. According to Francesca Polletta, when the Southern civil rights 
movement organizers “transposed” conceptual frameworks from one 
institutional domain to another, they provided new energy for resistance.238 
The music these activists composed is the work of “transposition,” which 
combines, for example, legal rights formulations with “locally resonant 
justificatory rhetorics.”239 
Such work, through decentralized structures at some distance from 
national or state civil rights organizations, encouraged tactical and ideological 
experimentation and innovation, built organizational solidarity, and enabled 
movement activists to broaden their appeal in some cases and in other cases to 
engage, at minimum, in critical reflection.240 When a “dynamic” constituency 
names its own reality by, for example, singing spirituals in the church choir, 
composing its own anthems in the call and response of the amen corner, or 
summoning in plain English, before a television audience, the brutal hardship 
of trying to register to vote in Mississippi, movement activists supply 
additional sources of authority for the lawyer and a new source of 
accountability for both the lawyer and “the law.” By expressing what the law 
means to those subject to it, activists create new grounds on which to interpret 
the law and make it harder for elites to say it means something other than what 
those on the street thought it should mean if it were talking to their experience. 
Any substantial disjunction is felt as injustice. It is through this potential 
feedback effect that those who sing the music of law can have a role in 
composing its logic. 
By defining winning in its narrowest possible terms, as Joe Rauh did with 
the MFDP, lawyers may prompt litigants to celebrate important tactical 
victories. At the same time, the strategic vision essential to sustainable long-
term change can be lost.241 Nonetheless, whatever their historically contingent 
 
238.  Polletta, supra note 24, at 379. Polletta describes the importance of the black church in 
“nurturing counterhegemonic challenges” and preserving alternative normative 
frameworks. By emphasizing and pushing the black church’s social gospel mission, civil 
rights activists were able to foster cultural challenges that “promoted the compatibility of 
religious and legal idioms.” Id. at 379-80. 
239.  Id. at 379. 
240.  Id. at 380-81. By raising its collective voice, the community’s music can change its own 
understanding of what it is capable of and what organized power can do. Such a dynamic 
constituency builds from a shared identity by developing a structure (rituals, commitments, 
leadership) for sustaining that identity and naming things that they understand to be true 
(the ideology/epistemology divide). 
241.  See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 14; Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the 
Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005); see also Michael 
Grinthal, Lawyers and Relational Organizing 23 (May 15, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) 
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role, Fred Gray’s relationship with the MIA shows that law and lawyers 
ultimately do much of the heavy lifting in shaping a social movement’s 
trajectory in fashioning both its short term objectives and long term 
consequences.242 Because lawyers occupy both an elite and expert position and 
often do not reflect on the impact of their expertise on their imagination, their 
role in social movements deserves more attention. 
Cause lawyers and legal scholars have begun to take notice of the multiple 
ways practicing lawyers, organizers, and policy makers can and do represent 
marginalized communities to tell different stories and make new law.243 There 
is renewed interest in researching the relationship between social movements 
and lawmaking among legal scholars and practitioners on the left244 as well as 
the right.245 
 
(on file with authors) (describing the way litigation over rights can define claimants by their 
weakness and their need for state intervention). Cf. Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to 
Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. 
HIST. 92 (2004) (explaining that one of the conflicts within the strategy to desegregate the 
South was how to eliminate the bad effects of race while keeping the good effects of race). 
242.  Austin Sarat calls the difference between concrete objectives and long-term intangible 
outcomes “first” and “second” generational change. Telephone Interview with Austin Sarat 
(Nov. 30, 2006). There is a chronological distinction in time-sensitive terms; he also intends 
to draw attention to the difference between tangible change and intangible change. Id. 
Thomas Stoddard terms this “rule-shifting” versus “culture shifting.” See Stoddard, supra 
note 10, at 973. 
243.  See, e.g., Ann Southworth, Professional Identity and Political Commitment Among Lawyers for 
Conservative Causes, in THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN 
LEGAL PRACTICE 83 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005). 
244.  There is a growing body of legal scholarship on this subject, much of it coming out of Yale 
Law School. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 14; Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, 
Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006); Brown-Nagin, supra note 241; 
Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 
YALE L.J. 256 (2005); Robert Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the 
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003); Siegel, supra note 
55; Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004); Reva B. Siegel, Text in 
Context: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 
(2001); see also KRAMER, supra note 14; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based 
Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., 
Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social 
Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2001). But cf. Lucas Powe, 
Are “the People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855 (2005) 
(reviewing KRAMER, supra note 14). 
During the 1980s and 1990s there was also an energetic set of conversations about the 
relationship between law, litigation, and social change. The critical legal studies movement 
devoted substantial attention to a critique of rights, especially those that direct claimants’ 
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Even so, much of the focus is still on discovering new avenues for elite 
driven social change. Some cause lawyers search for ways to do “public 
education” or develop “communications strategies” to win support for their 
cases, but they rarely pause to wonder whether the cases they litigate resonate 
with the lived experience of their clients, not just their putative supporters and 
funders.246 Sociologists, political scientists, and historians have long studied 
social movements, yet their theories of social change also separate out the role 
of law and lawyers, as if lawyers and social movement actors function on 
parallel but distinctive tracks. Similarly, many lawyers and law professors still 
focus on legal cases and judicial opinions without necessarily considering the 
social, political, and historical forces that influence the development of legal 
doctrine. Unlike Professor Ackerman, they concern themselves primarily with 
formal lawmaking by the judiciary, the legislature, or the executive. Lawyers, in 
particular, too often assume that their maximum opportunity to influence the 
 
attention to social change through litigation. Much of the earlier work, however, focused 
specifically on the work of litigators and courts. Some scholars have also put the genre of 
“legisprudence” on the table. See, e.g., Robin West, Katrina, the Constitution, and the Legal 
Question Doctrine, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1127, 1170 (2006). The newer scholarship has 
broadened the conversation to include the work of non-legal actors, as well. Our particular 
focus, however, is on the dynamic relationship between lawmaking and meaning making, in 
which meaning making originates and takes hold at the grassroots level not just in the 
courts or legislature. 
245.  For example, conservative lawyers, funders, and activists who joined to animate, narrate, 
and authorize fundamental legal change in the last quarter of the twentieth century studied 
the careful, sequential litigation strategy of the NAACP in the 1940s and 1950s to overturn 
Plessy v. Ferguson. Their strategy slowly evolved in response to what they learned as they 
waged their battles against liberal judges, liberal media, and “lazy” poor people (generally of 
color). See Southworth, supra note 243; see also Kimberly Liu, The Role of Litigation 
Movement for Education Reform: A Case Study of the Milwaukee Voucher Campaign 
(2007) (unpublished student paper, Harvard Law School) (on file with authors). 
Adapting what they had learned, conservatives built a strategy that abandoned the 
explicitly racist or sexist appeals of the past and instead use sophisticated yet resonant 
rhetoric to tell a story about the American Dream under siege. Fighting for individual 
opportunity, family values, and the legitimate rewards of hard work, their core constituency 
mobilized to push back and overturn iconic decisions, chipping away at their legal as well as 
popular rationale (as in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)) or co-opting arguments for 
equality through a form of national amnesia (as in Parents Involved v. Seattle School District 
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007)). The courts, working in tandem with citizen initiatives, such as 
the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative that passed in 2006, continue to redefine the meaning 
of conventional civil rights, feminist, and labor victories. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend 
Affirmative Action, 2014 WL 1577512 (U.S. 2014). One of the big lessons from the successes 
of conservative change agents is that legal as well as social changes take place on street 
corners and around kitchen tables, not just inside courthouses or legislatures. 
246.  This is not a new issue. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and 
Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). 
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law is through formal argument in judicial settings. Their argument, however, 
is not necessarily situated in a larger story that has normative force of its own 
and may be distinguishable from what the courts say is important. Even when 
moments of popular constitutionalism are considered, the actions of “the 
people” count only when they can be canonized through the published 
opinions of courts or the statutory language of legislators.247 In either case, it is 
the judiciary that serves as law’s authoritative editor. 
By contrast, we contend that democratic societies are organized to produce 
a variety of authoritative interpretive communities.248 The MFDP, 
Montgomery Bus Boycott, and UFW stories exemplify the ways a social 
movement functioning as an authoritative interpretative community can play a 
critical role in redefining the meaning of accountability, democratic action, and 
American democracy. 
Hamer and the other MFDP delegates were exemplary “wind changers.” 
Their goal was to widen the scope of meaningful participation in decision-
making. They questioned the limited definition of what is legitimate 
representation; they redefined meaningful participation; and they insisted on a 
wider scope for who should be included in decision-making. By contrast, the 
politicians and the national leaders, as members of the state apparatus, stood 
with their wet fingers in the wind without noticing that the weather was 
changing. 
The roles played by Fred Gray and other lawyers in the Montgomery Bus 
Boycott, the story that law ultimately tells, the driving ideal of equality, the 
assumption about the source of power to make change, and the definition of 
success all reflect the distinctive interpretive communities to which the lawyers 
felt they were accountable. In the case of the bus boycott, law is practiced 
tactically. It retains its link to a mobilized community that is seeking change to 
produce justice. A narrative whose higher authority comes from the idea that 
 
247.  KRAMER, supra note 14; William E. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth 
Century: Reflections on the Dark Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagination, and the 
Enduring Role of Judicial Finality in Popular Understandings of Popular Self-Rule, 81 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 967 (2006). 
248.  See supra notes 116-119, 138-144 and accompanying text (discussing the way the Mississippi 
Freedom Democratic Party in 1964 and the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955 functioned as 
alternative yet authoritative interpretative communities). Part of the object of our 
investigation is to map the intersections of these various communities. Generalizable 
meaning occurs at the intersections, and law crosses a variety of authoritative interpretive 
communities, pulling meaning from these various communities. These communities, 
however, are dynamic and thus put legal meaning under a continuous flux of varying 
intensities. One way that this flux is mediated is through the interaction of law, lawyers, and 
social movements. 
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national citizenship applies to black people in Alabama motivates this 
community. These people are inspired to take risks in support of this ideal 
because of their belief in a just God and the support they gain from religious 
cultural rituals, as manifest in the religious tenor, the spirituality, and the 
singing at mass meetings. Through their collective struggle and communal 
resourcefulness they gain a sense of agency and create a constituency of 
resistance that builds a new organization and inspires a series of national 
movements. 
The texts of their stories were written with the ink of consummate courage 
by a mobilized community that actively represented itself. These social 
movement actors changed the background against which questions of legality 
and justice were understood. They marched. They sang. They declaimed in 
their unschooled voices. They changed the wind. And in the process, they 
transformed the “thin paper” of democracy to the “thick action” of government 
of, by, and for the people. 
